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Abstract  This paper examines the cash holding and how it is determined by financial constraints of 
corporate Norway using a comprehensive dataset that covers both private and public firms 
from 1995 to 2012. I find that aggregate cash holdings increase almost twofold from 1990s 
(around 5-6%) to recent years (9-10%), a trend similar to U.S. firms, though slightly less 
significant. I then examine the correlation between cash holdings and financial constraints 
both on the aggregate level and the individual firm level. Time series evidence supports the 
notion that aggregate cash holdings decline following better macro-economic conditions. 
However, firm-level cash holdings are negatively correlated with conventional measures of 
financial constraints, such as Whited-Wu index and Hadlock and Pierce index. The 
contradiction with theory here implies that the extent of financial constraint might be mis-
measured, an issue recently discussed in Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013). I use two event 
studies to revolve the measurement error and endogeneity problem involved. Specifically, I 
trace the evolution of cash holdings around IPO and delisting events which suddenly alter the 
extent of financial constraints faced by firms. I find that the cash ratio decreases roughly by 
35% within two years after a private firm becomes public and increases by 37.5% two years 
after a public firm goes private, which is in line with cash holdings increasing with financial 
constraints. This finding is robust to several competing hypotheses, such as changes in 
corporate governance and growth opportunities around such events. 
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 “There is no necessity to hold idle cash to bridge over intervals if it can be obtained without difficulty at the moment when it is actually required.”      John Maynar Keynes 
              The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money 
1. Introduction  
There is a secular trend of US firms holding more and more cash while at the same time cash 
holdings exhibit considerable variations across firms (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). The 
surprisingly high cash in hands of some giant firms such as Apple has drawn lots of attention 
from both academic scholars and industry practitioners1. The natural question to ask is why 
firms hold so much cash. Admittedly, holding cash arises from the existence of frictions in the 
market for external financing as there is no reason to hold cash in a perfect world. This then 
becomes a difficult question to answer as there are several motives playing a role. In this 
paper, I rely on a sample comprised of both public and private firms operating in Norway and 
relate firms’ cash holdings to the degree of financial constraints. My result highlights the 
importance of financial constraints in determining firms’ optimal cash holdings. 
 
To answer why a firm holds cash is a complex task because there are many kinds of motives 
that play a role in shaping cash holding policy for a firm. Financial literature casts light on 
several motives concerning why a firm holds cash. Starting with a transactional point of view, 
it is costly for firms to convert non-cash assets into cash assets; hence it is necessary to hold 
cash in case of urgent payments.  Also, the precautionary motive of holding cash prevails in 
financial literature, namely when external economic shocks come, it will become difficult for 
firms to get access to external capital markets. Holding sufficient cash in event of such 
external shocks could help firms get funding for potential investment projects. Taxation 
considerations also determine how multi-nationals allocate their cash across subsidiaries. The 
last frequently mentioned motive rests on agency theory. Jensen (1986) claims that managers 
tend to hold more cash for personal benefits (e.g. excessive expansion) when lucrative 
investment opportunities are not available.  
 
Financial constraints can be simply defined as financial frictions that prevent firms from 
getting necessary funding. Literature also identifies several financial constraint 
                                                        
1 Holding more than $190 billion cash per May 2015, Apple is the leading firm among S&P 500 firms in terms of cash holding. Source: Matt Krantz. “$194B! Apple’s cash piles hit record,” USA Today, April 27, 2015 
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measurements. As one of the tasks in this paper is to understand how financial constraints 
affect cash holding, it is thus necessary to have concrete financial constraint measurements. 
Whited-Wu and Hadlock and Pierece indices are two measurements used in this paper. 
Another commonly used index is Kaplan and Zingal index; however, it is not possible to 
construct this index due to limitations of the dataset. Intuitively, financial constraints will 
negatively affect cash holding for a firm from a precautionary perspective. Nevertheless, I use 
Norwegian data to address this relationship empirically. Before doing that, I develop a full 
understanding of how cash holding situation evolves for Norwegian firms.  
 
I obtain corporate cash holding of Norwegian firms from Norwegian Corporate Accounts 
(SNFs and NHHs database med regnskaps- og foretaksinformasjon for norske selskaper), 
which is jointly maintained by Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and Centre for 
Academic Research at NHH. The sample data covers firms from 1995 to 2012 with positive 
book values. I start with presenting cash holdings development for Norwegian firms in a 
holistic way. Here, I also check how aggregate cash ratio interacts with some macroeconomic 
parameters (crude oil price, GDP growth rate and inflation rate), and then I investigate how 
cash holdings development unfolds for fishing and oil sectors as they impose significant 
impacts on Norwegian economy. Second, I study the relationship between cash holding and 
firm characteristics in a Norwegian setting. By performing different regressions between cash 
ratio and firm characteristics, I obtain a view of how this relationship displays in a Norwegian 
setting. Third, my key objective is to test whether the relationship between financial 
constraints and cash holdings stands for Norwegian firms. Using firm characteristics variables 
as control variables, I add financial constraint variables to test this relationship. Specifically, I 
examine how two financial constraint indices, Whited-Wu index and Hadlock – Pierece 
index, influence cash holdings. Purposely, I drop KZ-index as the lack of number of 
outstanding shares and stock price makes it impossible to calculate market capitalization, 
which is an essential component for constructing KZ index. Fourth, I conduct two event 
studies on how cash holdings change when firms are listed and delisted. The main reason of 
doing event studies is to try to overcome some shortcomings generated by OLS regressions. 
OLS regressions are susceptible to omitted variable bias, which can lead to endogeneity 
problem. The results of event study are interpreted with respect to agency theory suggested by 
Michael Jensen (1986). 
 
Some important findings of this paper are as following: 
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The aggregate cash ratio of Norwegian firms during sample year period has experienced a 
stably increasing trend, and this trend is negatively correlated with GDP growth rate and 
interest rate. Norwegian private firms hold more cash than public firms over the sample 
period. Also, Norwegian firms that pay dividend hold more cash than firms that do not pay 
dividend.   
 
Financial constraint measurements, WW index and HP index, have a negative correlation with 
cash holdings for Norwegian firms, and HP index have a better explanation power than WW 
index because HP index is made of components that cannot be changed by the firm itself. One 
standard deviation change of WW index leads to -0.016 standard deviation change of cash 
ratio according to OLS regression. Equivalently, one standard deviation change of HP index 
leads to -0.060 standard deviation change of cash ratio. Theory suggests that the financially 
constrained firms will hold less cash and the findings contradict with theory. This 
contradiction could potentially be attributed to measurement error which is recently discussed 
by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013) and endogeneity problem from which simple OLS 
regressions suffer. Meanwhile, dividend payment, being considered as a financial constraint 
measurement in literature, is positively correlated with cash holdings in this Norwegian 
sample, which could be explained by the fact that dividend-paying firms will hold more cash 
to fulfill this commitment. 
 
My data makes it possible to study the cash holding evolution around IPO and delisting 
events, which are two types of events resulting in sudden changes in financial constraints. 
When a firm goes public, it is generally believed that reaching out for new financing becomes 
easier. In contrast, firms will find it more difficult to secure outside financing when needed 
after they are delisted. Therefore, these two events offer a setting to test the causal effect of 
financial constraints on corporate cash holdings. I find that when a private firm becomes 
public, namely being listed, cash holding of this firm decreases. The average cash ratio 
decreases from 20% at IPO year to around 13% two years after IPO. Equivalently, when a 
public firm becomes private, namely being delisted, cash holding of this firm increases. The 
average cash ratio increases from 8% at delisting year to around 11% two years after 
delisting. 
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The results of event studies could be justified from a financial constraint perspective and 
could serve as interesting comparisons with respect to agency theory proposed by Michael 
Jensen (1986).  
 
Contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I study how cash holding situation changes for a 
wide range of Norwegian firms across a long time framework in a systematic way, 
establishing a thorough and fair understanding of cash holding situation in Norway from 1995 
to 2012. Second, I examine interplay between aggregate cash ratio and other macroeconomic 
parameters, probing the dynamic relationship between the cash ratio evolvement with respect 
to general macroeconomic changes in Norway. Third, by studying the evolution of corporate 
cash holdings around IPOs and delisting events, I establish a causal relationship between 
financial constraints and cash holdings which distinguish this paper from most previous work. 
2. Related literature and hypotheses 
 2.1 Literature review 
 
Under imperfect capital markets outside the classic perfect market case of Miller and 
Modigliani (1958), firms operate with frictions and imperfect financial flexibility. In fact, in a 
survey result by Graham and Harvey (2001), most CFOs believe financial flexibility to be the 
most important factor that determines the level of debt, as opposed to such common 
determents of capital structures as interest tax shield, credit risk or cash flow volatility (Akguc 
and Choi, 2013). Public and private firms would have different degrees of financial flexibility 
as private firms face more frictions than public firms given their constraint in raising new 
equity and higher borrowing costs than do public firms (Saunders and Steffen, 2011). As 
holding cash entails firms with the flexibility to invest, and it is the very flexibility that is 
cherished by most firms, so holding cash could contribute to alleviating some problems that 
are associated with investment.  
 According to Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009), there are four major incentives for firms to hold 
cash in economic and finance literature, and those four motives are as following: 
2.1.1 The transaction motive 
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Transaction costs incur when a firm convert noncash asset into cash and conduct payment 
with the cash, hence it is less expensive for firms to hold cash (or liquid assets) so as to get 
through urgent payments. If it is costly for the firm to be short of liquid assets, the firm 
equates the marginal cost of holding liquid assets to the marginal benefit. Holding an 
additional dollar of liquid assets reduces the probability of being short of liquid assets and 
decreases the cost of being short of cash under the reasonable assumption that the marginal 
benefit of liquid assets in a state of world decreases as the amount of liquid assets increase 
(Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999). Since there are economies of scale with the 
transaction motive, large firms hold less cash (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). From a 
transaction point of view, holding cash contributes to reducing costs for the firm, thus it 
creates strong incentive for the firm to hold cash. 
 
2.1.2 The precautionary motive 
 
The main idea of precautionary motive is that firm needs to hoard cash to cope with 
unexpected external shocks when accessing the capital market so that the firm would be able 
to finance NPV-positive investment or similar projects. For a firm with low cash flow, it is 
quite costly to raise funds externally because capital market would grant fund cautiously in 
such situation.  Findings of OPSW demonstrate that firms that have the greatest access to the 
capital markets (e.g. large firms and those with credit ratings) tend to hold lower ratios of cash 
to total assets. Almeida, Campello and Weisback (2004) model the precautionary demand of 
cash and find that financially constrained firms invest in cash out of cash flow, while 
unconstrained firms do not. (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009) Han and Qiu (2007) construct a 
model to show that cash holdings of financially constrained firms are sensitive to cash flow 
volatility because the financial constraints create an inter-temporal trade-off between current 
and future investments. Moreover, Acharya, Almeida and Campello (2007) demonstrate that 
financially constrained firms with high hedging needs have a strong propensity to save cash 
out of cash flows, while showing no propensity to reduce outstanding debt. 
 
2.1.3 The tax motive 
 
In addition to transaction cost motive and precautionary motive, the tax motive gives us a 
powerful tool to understand why many firms hold cash. Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) 
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provide tax-based explanation regarding cash holdings for firms, and they argue that U.S 
multinational firms hold cash in their foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated 
with repatriating foreign income. Empirical result is consistent with the hypothesis, showing 
that firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels of cash, hold this cash 
abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings.  
2.1.4 The agency motive 
  
The agency problem could cause firms to hoard extra cash after controlling for the effects 
from transaction cost and precautionary incentive. Jensen (1986) claims that entrenched 
managers are more inclined to hoard cash rather than giving out dividend when firms are 
faced with non-appealing investment projects. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) 
conclude that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold 
up to twice as much cash as corporations in countries with good shareholder projection. 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) demonstrate 
that cash is worth less when agency problems between insiders and outside shareholders are 
greater.  
 
Those four motives for holding cash have different implications for the causes and 
consequences of the secular increase in cash for U.S. firms (Bates, Kahle and Stultz, 2009). 
Some firms hold extra cash due to one or two motives, however, while for some firms, all 
four motives are applicable.  The growth in derivative markets and improvements in 
forecasting and control suggest, all else equal, a lower precautionary demand for cash 
holdings. However, there has been a secular increase in idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel, and Xu, 2001). After having gained understanding of why firms choose to hold cash, 
I proceed to review determinants of cash holdings. 
2.1.5 Determinants of cash holdings 
 
Extant literature has illuminated some key determinants of cash holdings for firms. Opler, 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) find that there are several influential factors 
determining cash balances including corporate growth prospects, short-term working capital 
imbalances, leverage, industry volatility, and firm size. There results show high consistency 
with precautionary motive. Also, the authors also find that correlation between use of 
derivatives and cash holdings.  
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2.1.6 Measures of financial constraints 
 
It is difficult to measure financial constraints that a firm faces; therefore indirect 
measurements are used to address this issue. Existing proxies aim to infer financial 
constraints from firms’ statements about their funding situation or changes in investment 
plans, their actions (such as not paying a dividend), or their characteristics (such as being 
young, or small, or having low leverage, or not having a credit rating). The literature is 
divided on which of these best captures financial constraints and as a result, empirical studies 
tend to employ a range of measures for robustness (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013). 
Lamont, Polk and Saá-Requejo (2001) define financial constraints as frictions that prevent the 
firm from funding all desired investments. They argue that this inability to fund investment 
might be due to credit constraints or inability to borrow, inability to issue equity, dependence 
on bank loans, or illiquidity of assets. Although there is interconnectedness among financial 
constraints, financial distress and bankruptcy risk, etc. it is important not to confound 
financial constraints with other similar concepts.  
 
In order to understand and study the importance of financial constraints with regard to firm 
behaviors, many different indices have been suggested. Based on Hayashi’s Q-investment 
model, Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP, 1988) find a significant sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow in a sample of 422 firms over the period 1970 to 1984. Based on the finding that 
cash flow sensitivities are especially large among the 49 sample firms that pay no or low 
dividends, FHP conclude that significant cash flow sensitivities reflect empirically important 
financial constraints (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013). One implicit finding from FHP’s 
research is that low dividend is a good measurement of financial constraints.  
 
By studying the annual reports of the 49 low-dividend firms proposed by FHP, Kaplan and 
Zingales have found out that only 15% of firm-years show evidence of firms being unable to 
fund their desired investments (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013). Further findings indicate 
that cash flow sensitivities fail to predict financial constraints among sample firms and yield 
contrarily adverse results. Moreover, they also show that low dividends are not a proper 
indicator of financial constraints.  
 
The actual KZ index is consummated by Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001). Those 
authors estimate an ordered logit model relating the degree of financial constraints according 
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to Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) classification to five readily available accounting variables: 
cash flow, market value, debt, dividends, and cash holdings, each scaled by total assets 
(Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013).  The KZ index is higher for firms that are more 
constrained (Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo, 2001).  
 
Hadlock and Pierece (2010) use qualitative information to categorize a firm's financial 
constraint status by carefully reading statements made by managers in SEC filings for a 
sample of randomly selected firms from 1995 to 2004.  To evaluate the KZ index, Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) estimate ordered logit models in which a firm's categorized level of 
constraints is modeled as a function of five Compustat- based variables. This modeling 
approach parallels the analysis of Lamont et al. (2001), who create the original KZ index by 
estimating similar models using the original Kaplan and Zingales (1997) sample. In the 
ordered logit models Hadlock and Pierce (2010) estimate, only two of the five components of 
the KZ index, cash flow and leverage, are consistently significant with a sign that agrees with 
the KZ index.  The index created by Hadlock and Pierce rests on size (with a negative 
loading), size-squared (positive), and age (negative) (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013).  
 
Another commonly used measurement of financial constraint is credit rating. According to 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013), there are two main motivations for this specific 
measurement. First, unrated firms are assumed to have no access to the public debt markets. 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006) and they need to resort to intermediaries such as banks on 
less competitive terms. Second, a rated firm may suffer less from information asymmetries 
problem between the investors and the firm. An unrated firm is more opaque and the external 
investors are more likely to place some sanction on them compared to rated firms.   
 
Whited and Wu (2006) construct an index of firms’ external finance constraints via 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of an investment Euler equation. 
Unlike the commonly used KZ index, theirs is consistent with firm characteristics associated 
with external finance constraints. (Whited and Wu, 2006) 
 
The index is effectively measured as the projection of the shadow price of raising equity 
capital onto the following variables: cash flow to assets (with a negative loading); a dummy 
capturing whether the firm pays a dividend (negative); long-term debt to total assets 
(positive); size (negative); sales growth (negative); and industry sales growth (positive).  
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Denis and Sibilkov (2009) used a sample of 74,347 firm-year observations between 1985 and 
2006 to confirm that positive association between cash and firm value is stronger for 
financially constrained firms. Another finding of their study demonstrates that association 
between firm value and investment is much stronger for constrained firms than for the 
unconstrained ones. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the view that cash 
holdings are more valuable to constrained firms because cash allows constrained firms to 
increase investment, and the marginal investment of constrained firms is more strongly 
related to value than that of unconstrained firms (Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). 
2.2 Hypotheses formulation 
 In spite of diversity of financial constraint measurement, the essence of a financial constraint 
measures a firm’s ability to access external funding. When lucrative investment opportunities 
rise, a financially constrained firm will have difficult in raising funding to finance 
investments, meanwhile a financially unconstrained firm will have ease to get access to 
external capital market and raise funding for own use. Firms that are financially constrained 
effectively face an inelastic supply of external capital: raising external capital quickly 
becomes even more expensive (reflecting a steep supply curve) and in the limit the firm is 
shut out of the capital markets (a vertical supply curve). In contrast, firms that can raise a 
large amount of external capital without much of an increase in the cost of capital are 
plausibly unconstrained (Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013).  
 
In previous literature review, I have identified four motives regarding why a firm holds cash, 
however, it is complex to understand exactly why a firm holds cash as many factors can play 
a role in making this decision. Intuitively, a financial constrained firm would hold more cash 
due to its limitations to external capital market. By holding cash, a financially constrained 
firm would then have the ease of financing good investment opportunities. Accordingly, the 
first hypothesis is based on this very intuition and the purpose of this hypothesis is to confirm 
or disconfirm the intuitive relationship between being financially constrained and holding 
cash.  
 
Hypothesis 1: In Norwegian setting, financial constraint measurement will have a positive 
correlation with cash holding. 
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The transition from private firm to public firm is associated with the increased capability of 
getting access to external capital market. By selling shares, in most cases it is easier for a 
public firm to get external capital than a private firm. Based solely on the essence of financial 
constraints and the different degrees of access to capital market, it is also interesting to 
explore how firm’s status transition will exert impacts on cash holdings for private and public 
firms. Within the same firm, it can be inferred that being private entails the stronger need for 
holding more cash compared to being public, hence I formulate hypothesis 2 as following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to being private, a firm will reduce its cash holding when it becomes 
listed.  
 
Correspondingly, the cash holding situation would be reverse when a firm transits from being 
private to being public, so hypothesis 3 is also formulated in similar way. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to being public, a firm will increase its cash holding after it is 
delisted.  
 
The first hypothesis is formulated to test out the direct relationship between being financially 
constrained and holding cash, and the second and third hypotheses are extensions of testing 
this relationship by using specific events. In the following part of this paper, I disclose the 
empirical results by analyzing Norwegian firms.  
3. Methodology and data 
3.1 Methodology 
 In this paper, I will use OLS, Fama-MacBeth, and fixed effects regressions to explore how 
firm characteristics and financial constraint measurements affect cash holdings. However, 
simple OLS regressions cannot be free from endogeneity problem which could possibly over- 
or under-estimate the effect of interest. For instance, omitted variables such as corporate 
governance could determine both the amount of cash holdings and the level of financial 
constraints. Realizing the pitfalls of cross-sectional studies, I conduct two event studies to 
exploit within-firm variations which better captures the effect of sudden changes of financial 
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constraints on the decision to hold cash. Specifically, I examine the evolution of cash 
holdings around IPO and delisting events, with the assumption that becoming a public firm 
relieve financial constraints and delisted firms generally become more difficult to secure 
outside financing when needed. 
 
3.2 Data description and sample selection 
 Based on database of Norwegian Corporate Accounts, made jointly by Norwegian School of 
Economics (NHH) and Centre for Academic Research at NHH, I construct a sample for the 
period from 1995 to 2012. The database consists of existing and non-existing firms that 
appear in Norwegian Corporate Accounts at any time in this sample period. Criteria I made 
for sample selection are as following: a). Firms should have positive values for book value of 
total assets, thus I exclude non-positive observations. b). Firms should carry positive sales 
revenues, thus non-positive sales revenues observations are also excluded; c). Financial firms 
(SN2007 code 64 to 69) are excluded because they may carry cash to meet capital 
requirements, hence including them could create bias. Also, utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 
plus code 4399 and 8129) are also excluded because they their cash holdings might be 
affected by regulation. The generated panel has 72602 observations for 17559 unique firms. 
d). Sample only covers Norwegian firms.   
3.3 Summary statistics Table of Summary Statistics This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. After controlling for a series of independent variables, the number of observations is reduced to 21918 for net debt issuance and net equity issuance variables, and 25484 for other independent variables. This table shows the summary statistics of dependent variables and most important independent variables.  
Summary Statistics 
  Number of observations Mean Median Min Max Standard deviation 
Cash ratio 25484 0.150 0.100 0.001 0.728 0.149 
Log cash ratio 25484 -2.273 -2.202 -6.322 0.972 1.367 
Industry sigma 25484 0.042 0.035 0.014 0.157 0.022 
Sales growth 25484 0.482 0.039 -0.961 25.070 2.660 
Real size 25484 12.002 11.728 6.196 16.210 1.492 
Cash flow to assets 25484 0.087 0.087 -0.536 0.367 0.100 
NWC to assets 25484 0.018 0.015 -0.869 0.550 0.206 
Capex 25484 -0.035 0.000 -1.629 0.526 0.268 
Leverage ratio 25484 0.288 0.248 0.000 1.157 0.233 
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R&D to sales 25484 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.201 0.024 
WW Index 25484 4.896 -0.414 -1.081 190.523 23.803 
HP Index 25484 -3.346 -3.253 -6.382 -1.301 0.901 
Dividend dummy 25329 0.099 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.299 
d_2000s 25484 0.956 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.206 
Net debt issuance  21918 0.299 0.030 -0.798 6.029 1.024 
Net equity issuance 21918 0.151 0.022 -0.638 2.734 0.512 
Loss 25484 0.199 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.399  
The table shows general statistics of dependent and independent variables for regressions in 
later sections. The sample covers 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms after excluding 
financial firms and utilities. After controlling for different independent variables, the number 
of observations for regressions has reduced to between 20000 and 30000.  
3.4 Cash holding for Norwegian firms in a holistic perspective  
Table I(A) 
Average and Median Cash and Leverage Ratios from 1995 to 2012 for Norwegian Firms 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive 
values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 
to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a 
panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
 
Year N Aggregate 
Cash Ratio 
Average 
Cash Ratio 
Median 
Cash 
Ratio 
Average 
Leverage 
Median 
Leverage 
Average Net 
Leverage 
Median Net 
Leverage 
1995 6665 0,0696 0,1410 0,0857 0,3622 0,3010 0,2221 0,1943 
1996 7126 0,0666 0,1394 0,0860 0,3640 0,3048 0,2253 0,2011 
1997 8113 0,0474 0,1402 0,0866 0,3636 0,3103 0,2242 0,1971 
1998 8556 0,0510 0,1343 0,0792 0,3642 0,3171 0,2308 0,2153 
1999 2820 0,0580 0,1261 0,0797 0,3213 0,2866 0,1959 0,1907 
2000 2748 0,0496 0,1248 0,0731 0,3197 0,2784 0,1950 0,1864 
2001 2797 0,0526 0,1237 0,0743 0,3221 0,2864 0,1990 0,1930 
2002 2676 0,0533 0,1310 0,0794 0,3309 0,2974 0,1999 0,1941 
2003 2310 0,0769 0,1335 0,0887 0,3248 0,2935 0,1913 0,1861 
2004 2232 0,0835 0,1387 0,0944 0,3134 0,2793 0,1747 0,1739 
2005 2332 0,0928 0,1400 0,0975 0,3135 0,2786 0,1735 0,1735 
2006 2194 0,0890 0,1439 0,0961 0,2927 0,2555 0,1488 0,1468 
2007 2382 0,0943 0,1458 0,1001 0,2933 0,2568 0,1473 0,1388 
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2008 2527 0,0821 0,1396 0,0915 0,3120 0,2677 0,1726 0,1617 
2009 2590 0,0820 0,1467 0,1002 0,3127 0,2721 0,1661 0,1614 
2010 2581 0,1005 0,1455 0,0969 0,3033 0,2598 0,1577 0,1560 
2011 3017 0,0848 0,1456 0,0928 0,3040 0,2597 0,1585 0,1562 
2012 3130 0,0855 0,1354 0,0882 0,3057 0,2661 0,1707 0,1689 
 
 
The second column of Table I (A) is the number of sample firms each year. Cash ratio is 
measured as the relationship between cash and cash equivalents (cash variables in the dataset) 
and total assets (TotalAssets variable in the dataset). The third column is the aggregate cash 
ratio, which is calculated by using sum of cash divided by sum of total assets. This ratio is 
about 6.96% at 1995 and it decreased slightly to 5.33% in 2002, then it increases to peak at 
10.05% in 2010. By 2012, this ratio is 8.55%, which is higher than the initial year. As for 
mean cash ratio, it experiences a minor decrease until year 2002, and then it starts to 
experience another minor increase. Generally, the mean cash ratio fluctuates around the initial 
level, which is around 14.10%. Regarding median cash ratio, there is slight decrease until year 
2001, decreasing from 8.57% to 7.43%, then it starts to increase again until 2007, amounting 
to 10.01%. In the last five years, fluctuations occur and median cash ratio ends up with 
8.82 %, which is not very different from the initial value. I am also interested in knowing if 
there is a statistically significant trend in the aggregate cash ratio, thus I run regression of 
average cash ratio on a constant and time measured in year (not reported in Table I (A)). The 
coefficient on the year for average cash ratio reports a yearly decrease of 0.23% for cash ratio 
and the p-value is below 0.01. ܴଶ of the regression is 55.5%.  
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Figure 1. Aggregate Cash Ratio and Macroeconomic Parameters. This sample includes all 
observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of 
total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 
code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations 
for 17558 unique firms. Interest rate is derived from Norwegian central bank and GDP growth rate is based on 
statistics from the World Bank. Aggregate cash ratio derives from Table 1A. 
 
I compare interest rate 2 development and GDP growth 3 from 1995 to 2012 in Norway to 
aggregate cash ratio to see how this ratio resonates with macroeconomic parameters.  
As Figure 1 shows, the aggreate cash ratio shares a slightly increasing trend whereas GDP 
growth and interest rates experience decreasing trends over sample years.  Between 2003 and 
2006, aggregate cash ratio has increased from around 5% to 9%, which is the most dramatic 
increase observed in this graph.  During the same period, there are fluctuations in both interest 
rate and GDP growth and the dominating trend is downwards. According to precautionary 
motive, firms need to hold more cash to deal with unexpected external shocks. Weak 
macroeconomy will impose shocks to firms in terms of getting access to external capital 
                                                        
2 Interest rate is based on statistics from Norges Bank (Norway’s central bank). Access: http://www.norges-bank.no/Statistikk/Rentestatistikk/Styringsgrente-arlig/ 
3 GDP growth rate is based on statistics from The World Bank. Access:  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
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market and financing future investments, which could help explain the trend that is observed 
in Figure 1, suggesting a negative correlation between cash holdings and general  
macroeconomic outlook. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of how aggregate cash ratio changes with respect to 
macro economy, I also run regressions between aggregate cash ratio and other some 
macroeconomic parameters. Those regressions are conducted by using arima command in 
Stata. In addition to GDP growth rate, I include also inflation rate and real oil price growth 
rate (nominal oil price growth rate minus inflation rate). 
 
Table I (B1) shows aggregate cash ratio is positively correlated with lag GDP growth rate. 
Even though the coefficients are not significant, it demonstrates that if previous GDP growth 
is negative, it will lead to increasing cash ratio for Norwegian firms.  As oil price is another 
proxy of how GDP growth unfolds for Norwegian economy, I can also see a negative 
correlation between oil price and aggregate cash ratio. Current GDP growth rate is positively 
correlated with aggregate cash ratio. When GDP outlook seems promising, Norwegian firms 
will increase their cash holding.  
 
Table I (B2) shows that how differenced macroeconomic parameters affect differenced 
aggregate cash ratio. Consistent with Table I (B1), the differenced GDP growth rate also has a 
negative impact on differenced aggregate cash ratio. Looking at current level, the current 
differenced GDP growth is positively correlated with differenced aggregate cash ratio, 
meaning that if the GDP growth rate between current year and previous year is positive, 
Norwegian firms will also hold more cash than previous year, namely the differenced 
aggregate cash ratio is positive. Similar with Table I (B1), the differenced oil price parameter 
has the same effect on differenced aggregate cash ratio for Norwegian firms. 
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Table I (B1) Aggregate Cash Ratio and Macroeconomic Parameters This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. In this table, dependent variable is aggregate cash ratio. The table is generated by using arima command in Stata, which predicts models with time-dependent disturbances, which are allowed to follow a linear autoregressive moving-average (ARMA). The first table is calculated by using one lag.     
  Current Level Lag Level Next Level 
GDP Growth Rate 0.121   -0.21   0.24                  
 -0.576   -0.116   -0.204                  Inflation Rate  -0.183   -0.17   0.058                 
  -0.555   -0.455   -0.83                 Real Oil Price Growth Rate   0.009   -0.011   0.017    -0.468   -0.119   -0.112           Constant 0.064*** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
L.ar 0.834*** 0.805*** 0.809*** 0.749*** 0.782*** 0.831*** 0.868*** 0.804*** 0.840*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
                         Sigma constant 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wald Chi2 (2) 36.89 32.16 39.15 17.83 21.64 39.6 71.7 26.84 31.59 
N 20 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 
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Table I (B2) Aggregate Cash Ratio and Macroeconomic Parameters This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. In this table, dependent variable is aggregate cash ratio. The table is generated by using arima command in Stata, which predicts models with time-dependent disturbances, which are allowed to follow a linear autoregressive moving-average (ARMA).This table is differenced, meaning that it predicts how differenced independent variables predict the differenced dependent variable.   
  Current Level Lag Level Next Level 
Differenced GDP Growth Rate 0.142   -0.161   0.299   
 -0.507   -0.355   -0.092   Differenced Inflation Rate  -0.142   -0.148   0.077  
  -0.533   -0.593   -0.766  Differenced Real Oil Price Growth Rate   0.008   -0.012   0.016* 
   -0.48   -0.106   -0.035 Constant 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 -0.366 -0.381 -0.341 -0.651 -0.76 -0.486 -0.249 -0.39 -0.321 Sigma Constant 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Wald Chi2 (2) 4.440 0.390 0.500 0.850 0.290 2.610 2.840 0.090 4.470 
N 19 19 19 18 18 18 18 18 18 
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I also want to understand the implications of changes in cash ratio for the measurement of 
leverage. Column 6 of Table I measures average debt for the sample firms by year. 
I also want to understand the implications of changes in cash ratio for the measurement of 
leverage. Column 6 of Table I measures average debt for the sample firms by year. 
Leverage is measured by using long-term liabilities divided by book value of total assets. 
(Including the short-term liabilities variable in the dataset will cause abnormal leverage ratios; 
hence I exclude short-term liabilities to establish a more realistic picture of leverage ratio). 
We can see that average leverage ratio of Norwegian firms has experienced a decreasing trend 
over sample years. It reaches peak at year 1998 with 36.42 % and then it starts to decrease 
gradually in the following years. By 2010, the average leverage is 30.33%, which is lowest. 
Median leverage, showed in column 7, has also experienced a gradual decrease. It starts with 
30.10% at year 1995 and ends with 26.61% at year 2012, and the yearly decrease is small yet 
consecutive. Taking a look at average net leverage ratio, which subtracts cash from debt, the 
general trend is approximately the same, showing that average net leverage ratio has 
decreased with some fluctuations. The initial value of average net leverage ratio at 1995 is 
22.21% and the value is 17.07% at year 2012.  The evidence from Table I (A) illustrates a 
stable decrease in average cash ratio till year 2005 and a gradual increase trend from 2005 to 
2012; however, the values of average cash ratios do not deviate a lot from the initial value. I 
also observe a corresponding decrease in net debt. The decrease in net debt in this sample 
occurs because Norwegian firms have less debt rather than they hold more cash. In order to 
assess whether the changes in cash is associated with firm size, I divide the sample firms into 
quintiles each year according to the book value of total assets.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the average cash ratios for different quintiles over sample period. As it 
shows, the average cash ratio shares a stable trend over sample years for each quintile, but the 
increase is more evident for quintile 5, which represents largest size of firms. Quintile 1 
shares a minor increase in the first three years before decreasing to 2000, after 2000, quintile 
1 has experienced a stable and very little increase. As for quintile 5, the decrease is obvious 
for the first five years, and then it experiences an increase to around 2006 before it encounters 
another small decrease until the end of sample period. Regarding quintile 2, 3, 4, they share a 
similar pattern of changes except for the last three years. Before 2009, Q2, Q3 and Q4 
experience a small decrease until 2000, and then they have a minor increase until 2009. For 
the last three years, Q2 and Q3 increase a little before having a minor decrease, whereas Q4 
shares a stably small decrease. Again, I run regression the cash ratio on a constant and time 
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(measured in years) for quintile 1 to 5, and find out that only slope is positive for Q3, and 
negative for Q4 and Q5. Coefficients of Q3 and Q4 are statistically significant whereas Q5 are 
highly statistically significant. Notably, coefficients of Q1 and Q2 are not significant. I can 
then conclude that the cash ratio is mainly driven by bigger firms for Norwegian sample.  
 
Figure 2. Average Cash Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2012. This sample 
includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the 
book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and 
utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on value of total assets. The 
first quintile (Q1) represents the smallest firms, while the fifth quintile (Q5) represents the largest firms in this 
sample. 
 
Figure 3 shows the average net leverage ratios for different quintiles over sample period. 
Quintiles 1, 2 and 3 have experienced a decline in average net leverage ratios over sample 
years, and Q1 has the most pronounced decrease among those three quintiles. Concerning 
quintile 4, I can see that the ratio has a slight decrease from 1995 to 2006, and then it has 
again a small increase, which compensates the previous decrease. As for quintile 5, 
representing the largest size of firms, there is an increase from 1995 to 2002, and then a slight 
decrease follows up to 2007 before it increases again to the end of sample period. Figure 4 (in 
.05
.1
.15
.2
Ca
sh/
Ass
ets
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Q1: Smallest firm size quintile Q2
Q3 Q4
Q5: Largest firm size quintile
Figure2. Average Cash Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2012
 
 
25 
Appendix), median net leverage ratios also share a similar pattern with average net leverage 
ratios, showing that quintile 5 has increased whereas quintile 1, 2 and 3 have decreased.  
 
Figure 3. Average Net Leverage Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2012. This 
sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for 
the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and 
utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on value of total assets. The 
first quintile (Q1) represents the smallest firms, while the fifth quintile (Q5) represents the largest firms in this 
sample. 
 
Private and public firms have different needs for cash holdings. Gao, Harford and Li (2012) 
argue that there are two dynamics working against each other in terms of cash holdings for 
public and private firms: 1). Agency conflicts between owners and managers are more 
pronounced for private firms than public firms, which could lead public firms to hoard more 
cash than private firms. 2). Financial frictions are less prevalent among public firms compared 
to private counterparts, causing public firms to hold less cash. Intuitively, due to its size and 
opaqueness private firms find more challenging to get external sources of financing compared 
to public firms. Those two factors could lead to opposite sentiments towards cash holdings for 
private and public firms and it is interesting to know how the outcome spells out for 
Norwegian firms.  
0
.1
.2
.3
Ne
t de
bt /
 As
set
s
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Q1: Smalles firm size quintile Q2
Q3 Q4
Q5: Largest firm size quintile
Figure 3. Average Net Leverage Ratios by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2012
 
 
26 
 
 
Table II (A) 
Average Cash Ratios from 1995 to 2012 Delineated by Firm Status, the Payment of 
Dividends, and Accounting Performance 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive 
values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 
to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a 
panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. A private firm is not registered at Oslo Stock Exchange. 
A public firm has done IPO and is currently available on Oslo Stock Exchange. A firm is classified as dividend 
payer if the firm pays dividend in the year. According to t-test, * indicates that the result is significant at 10% 
level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix. 
  Firm Status Dividend Status Accounting Performance 
Year Private Public Non-dividend payer Dividend Payer Nonnegative Net Income Negative Net Income 
1995 0.1414 0.1075** 0.1320 0.1703*** 0.1540 0.1013*** 
1996 0.1397 0.1187* 0.1301 0.1739*** 0.1538 0.0980*** 
1997 0.1406 0.1182** 0.1319 0.1705*** 0.1515 0.1054*** 
1998 0.1348 0.1085** 0.1248 0.1710*** 0.1509 0.0959*** 
1999 0.1268 0.1140 0.1248 0.1717*** 0.1382 0.0948*** 
2000 0.1251 0.1193 0.1248 0.1425 0.1345 0.1010*** 
2001 0.1249 0.1015** 0.1237  0.1385 0.0932*** 2002 0.1317 0.1194 0.1311 0.0369 0.1433 0.1063*** 
2003 0.1329 0.1497 0.1317 0.1680*** 0.1486 0.0938*** 
2004 0.1371 0.1753 0.1389 0.1338* 0.1434 0.1195*** 
2005 0.1394 0.1520 0.1388 0.1524 0.1473 0.1006*** 
2006 0.1430 0.1597 0.1427 0.1511 0.1529 0.0970*** 
2007 0.1461 0.1408*** 0.1451 0.1497 0.1552 0.1058*** 
2008 0.1419 0.1030*** 0.1361 0.1690*** 0.1630 0.1004*** 
2009 0.1484 0.1155*** 0.1415 0.1775*** 0.1635 0.1035*** 
2010 0.1467 0.1221** 0.1413 0.1706*** 0.1651 0.0935*** 
2011 0.1469 0.1164** 0.1404 0.1790*** 0.1642 0.0962*** 
2012 0.1365 0.1061** 0.1296 0.1673*** 0.1488 0.0954***  
Table II (A) shows that average cash ratio of private firms is higher than public firms in most 
years except for the period from year 2003 to year 2006. According to Figure 5, it can also be 
observed that average cash ratio of private firms experiences less dramatic changes compared 
to public firms. An observed trend for private firms is that average cash ratio decreases first, 
and then it stabilizes. As for public firms, there are some fluctuations from 1995 to 2001 
before it starts to rise again until 2004.  After 2004, it starts to have a significant decreasing 
trend again. The initial value of average cash ratios for private firms is 14.14% and it ends up 
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with 13.65% at 2012. The difference between initial value and end value is small. Even 
though the changes of average cash ratio for public firms are more volatile, the initial value 
with 10.75% has even smaller difference compared to the end value with 10.61%. In most 
years, private firms hold more cash than public firms, and this can be explained by referring 
to the one of the two reasons mentioned by Gao, Harford and Li (2012), namely that private 
firms face stronger financial frictions, making it more difficult for them to access external 
capital market, hence they hold more cash. The results from t-test also show that there are 11 
significant results out of 18 years, proving that validity of the observation in Norwegian 
sample. Table II (B) (In Appendix) illustrates median cash ratios between private and public 
firms. It can also be observed that private firms have generally higher median cash ratios than 
public firms and exceptions occur in year 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 where the opposite 
outcome is the case. The same trend that is concluded for average cash ratios are also 
applicable to median cash ratio. 
 
 
Figure 5. Average Cash Ratio Comparison between Private and Public firms from 1995 
to 2012. This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with 
positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 
code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, 
yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Average cash ratios for public and private 
firms are derived from Table II (A).  
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After examining the role of firm status, I would turn to the role of dividend. Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow theory shows that non-dividend payers with dim growth opportunities will 
hoard more cash. In columns 4 and 5 of Table II (A), it shows that dividend payers, however, 
hold more than non-dividend payers. As there is lack of data in 2001 and the cash ratio of 
dividend payer in 2002 is surprisingly low, I treat both years as outliers, thus they are 
excluded from interpretation. This outcome runs contrary to what free cash flow theory claims, 
which could invite different interpretations.  
 
The relationship between dividend payment and cash holdings is not always straightforward 
as it seems. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argues that firms that pay dividends can afford to hold 
less cash because they can simply cut dividend paying when they need extra funding. Also, 
paying dividend is often associated with being less financially constrained, which could also 
lead the firm to hold less cash. Nevertheless, they also argue that it is also possible that 
dividend payers hold more cash than non-dividend payers to avoid the situation where they 
are short of cash to fulfill dividend payment. Dividend is considered as a commitment to 
shareholders, and cutting dividend would send a negative signal to the market, affecting stock 
performance. The dynamic relationship between cash holdings and dividend payment makes 
it reasonable to assume that the latter explanation of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) reflects the 
reality of cash holdings among Norwegian firms. When taking a look at Table II (B), which 
also summarizes the median cash ratios for dividend and non-dividend payers, it shows that 
the median cash ratio of dividend payers is higher than non-dividend payers. This outcome 
aligns with what is observed in Table II (A) regarding average cash ratio.  
 
Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) argue that firms with negative net income are more likely to be 
financially constrained than firms with positive net income and their findings also 
demonstrate that cash flow sensitivity of corporate investment in cash differs for financially 
constrained firms. Based on this principle, I divide the sample into firms with nonnegative net 
income and firms with negative income. As Table II (A) shows, the average cash ratio is 
calculated for those two groups. In Norwegian setting, my observation is that average cash 
ratio of firms with nonnegative net income is higher than firms with negative net income, and 
there are bigger fluctuations in this ratio for former group than the latter one. No clear 
trending can be spotted.  
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After establishing an understanding of how cash holding situation evolves in Norway as an 
entity, I now want to distill two representative industries in Norway to analyze. The reason I 
choose fishing and oil industries is that Norwegian firms have cutting-edge competences and 
large market shares in both industries globally and they are vital for Norwegian economy, 
making them interesting candidates to probe.  
3.4.1 Cash holding trend for fishing industry in Norway 
 Table III Average and Median Cash and Leverage Ratio from 1995 to 2012 for Fishing Industry in Norway This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. The following table is on based the sample data and focuses solely on fishing industry in Norway. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix.   
Year N Aggregate Cash Ratio 
Average Cash Ratio 
Median Cash Ratio Average Leverage Median Leverage 
Average Net Leverage Median Net Leverage 
1995 68 0.0944 0.1383 0.0518 0.3288 0.2704 0.1905 0.1800 
1996 73 0.0726 0.1072 0.0282 0.3305 0.2661 0.2229 0.2427 
1997 93 0.0758 0.0946 0.0384 0.3593 0.3402 0.2647 0.2829 
1998 102 0.0715 0.0930 0.0432 0.3923 0.4034 0.2993 0.3149 
1999 40 0.0504 0.0631 0.0205 0.4355 0.4305 0.3723 0.3848 
2000 41 0.0539 0.0817 0.0607 0.4563 0.5147 0.3745 0.4070 
2001 50 0.0485 0.0937 0.0316 0.4430 0.4676 0.3486 0.3950 
2002 56 0.0600 0.0912 0.0333 0.4554 0.4653 0.3642 0.3998 
2003 54 0.0459 0.0449 0.0195 0.5278 0.5315 0.4829 0.4919 
2004 52 0.0396 0.0366 0.0158 0.5252 0.5197 0.4886 0.5033 
2005 50 0.0542 0.0572 0.0417 0.4774 0.4469 0.4202 0.4298 
2006 51 0.0941 0.0839 0.0523 0.3756 0.3532 0.2918 0.2763 
2007 55 0.0559 0.0783 0.0381 0.3519 0.3171 0.2736 0.2574 
2008 58 0.0391 0.0719 0.0381 0.4054 0.3723 0.3336 0.3108 
2009 60 0.0549 0.0579 0.0301 0.4313 0.3828 0.3734 0.3554 
2010 61 0.0800 0.0764 0.0582 0.4420 0.3624 0.3641 0.2995 
2011 71 0.0816 0.0849 0.0519 0.4478 0.3967 0.3619 0.3309 
2012 72 0.0724 0.0816 0.0497 0.4390 0.3895 0.3573 0.3330  
There are in total 1107 observations during over sample period for fishing industry. As Table 
III shows, generally average cash ratio has a decreasing trend, starting with roughly 13.83% at 
1995 and ending with 8.16% at 2012. This ratio decreases until year 1999, and it has 
experience some fluctuations until year 2009. After 2009, the average ratio has again a slight 
increase and it finally ends at 8.16%, which is around 5.6% lower than the starting value. The 
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aggregate cash ratio is also interesting indicator to examine. By using the similar method, I 
calculate the aggregate cash ratio for the Norwegian fishing industry. The development of this 
ratio is more volatile than other ratios. It starts with 9.44% at year 1995, and then it drops to 
the bottom at 3.96% at 2004 before it quickly reaches a high value at 9.41% at year 2006. 
Interestingly, it drops again quickly to 3.91% at year 2008. Since 2008, this ratio has 
increased again and it stops at 7.24% at year 2012. 
 
 I construct salmon price growth rate from 1996 to 20124 in order to see if how salmon price 
growth rates interact with average cash ratio and aggregate cash ratio. According to Figure 6, 
over the most sample years, cash ratios decrease when salmon price goes up. When salmon 
price goes up, it will bring positive effects to fishing industry, increasing revenues and cash 
flows for firms in this industry, displaying a good economic outlook. Referring to 
precautionary motive, firms will hold more cash when there are unexpected shocks to 
economy. When the general outlook of an industry is good, firms will most likely to reduce 
cash holdings. This reverse relationship between salmon price and cash holdings can be 
explained by using precautionary motive. Figure 6 also shows that aggregate cash ratio is 
lower than average cash ratio in most sample years. 
 
 
                                                        
4 Based on data covering salmon price history from week 01.1995 until 12.2013 from Norwegian Seafood Federation (FHL) and Norwegian Seafood Council 
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Figure 6. Cash Ratios and Salmon Price Growth Rate. This sample includes all observations from 
Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and 
sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 
plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 
unique firms. Average cash ratios and aggregate cash ratios derive from table III and salmon price growth rate is 
based weekly data from 01.1995 to 12.2013 from Norwegian Seafood Federation (FHL) and Norwegian Seafood 
Council.  
 
According to Figure 7 (In Appendix), average leverage ratio, median leverage ratio, average 
net leverage ratio and median net leverage ratio follow a similar trend. Those four ratios 
encounter an increase until year 2003, and then they experience a decrease until 2007 before 
having another minor increase. There are some individualistic variations in terms of the 
degree of increase and decrease for those four ratios, however, those variations are trivial and 
the pattern is more pronounced. 
3.4.2 Cash holding trend for oil industry in Norway 
 
 
Figure 8. Cash Ratio and Leverage Ratio progress in oil industry from 1995 to 2012. This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and 
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utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. All ratios in this figure are calculated within oil industry in Norway.    Table IV Average and Median Cash and Leverage Ratio from 1995 to 2012 for Oil Industry in Norway This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. The following table is on based the sample data and focuses solely on oil industry in Norway. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix.   
Year N 
Aggregate Cash Ratio 
Average Cash Ratio 
Median Cash Ratio Average Leverage Median Leverage 
Average Net Leverage Median Net Leverage 
1995 16 0.0521 0.0903 0.0587 0.3632 0.3764 0.2730 0.2924 
1996 17 0.0822 0.0950 0.0464 0.3677 0.3563 0.2727 0.2918 
1997 21 0.0639 0.1320 0.0853 0.3879 0.3643 0.2583 0.2938 
1998 24 0.0636 0.0944 0.0566 0.4252 0.3822 0.3301 0.3086 
1999 20 0.0330 0.0938 0.0582 0.3946 0.3672 0.3008 0.2727 
2000 17 0.0579 0.1105 0.0551 0.3186 0.3464 0.2081 0.2416 
2001 18 0.0350 0.1152 0.0621 0.3867 0.4401 0.2719 0.3689 
2002 17 0.0377 0.0986 0.0672 0.3876 0.4215 0.2891 0.3370 
2003 17 0.0372 0.0969 0.0539 0.3226 0.3017 0.2257 0.2645 
2004 16 0.0289 0.2025 0.1139 0.2576 0.2157 0.0551 -0.0097 
2005 15 0.0356 0.1964 0.0991 0.3044 0.2863 0.1080 0.1530 
2006 19 0.0319 0.1563 0.1008 0.4077 0.3795 0.2514 0.2949 
2007 25 0.0507 0.1481 0.0942 0.3835 0.3565 0.2355 0.2616 
2008 29 0.0426 0.1351 0.0610 0.3653 0.4489 0.2307 0.3099 
2009 27 0.0492 0.0945 0.0557 0.3850 0.3879 0.2905 0.2983 
2010 29 0.1147 0.1496 0.0715 0.3213 0.3221 0.1716 0.1199 
2011 34 0.0592 0.1277 0.0950 0.3070 0.2685 0.1793 0.1250 
2012 38 0.0836 0.1174 0.0875 0.3331 0.2876 0.2146 0.1992  
In total there are 399 observations in oil industry over the sample years, there is a slightly 
decreasing trend in aggregate cash ratio until year 2006. From 2006 to 2012, an increasing 
trend can be easily observed. The peak of aggregate cash ratio is at year 2010, amounting to 
11.47%, whereas the bottom of this ratio is at year 2004 with a value at 2.89%. As for average 
cash ratio and median cash ratio, the trends are similar except that average cash ratio has 
higher value than median cash ratio, so description of one suffices to capture the development 
of these two ratios.  The average cash ratio has experience some degree of fluctuations until 
year 2003, and from 2003 onwards, there is a significant jump in average cash ratio, 
increasing from 9.69% at 2003 to 20.25% at 2004. A decreasing trend is salient from year 
 
 
33 
2004 to year 2009. In the last three years of the sample, the average cash ratio increases a bit 
and it ends up with a value at 11.74%, which is slightly higher than the initial value at 9.03%.  
 
As Figure 8 shows the ratios regarding debt (both leverage ratio and net average ratio) have 
shared an overlapping pattern to a large extent, however, the changes in net leverage ratios are 
more dramatic than leverage ratios. Taking average leverage ratio and average net leverage 
ratio as examples, in spite of a decreasing trend, those two ratios have experienced large 
fluctuations from 1995 to 2000. From 2000 onwards, there is first an increase to 2002 before 
they drop significantly in 2004, which is the bottom point for all leverage ratios. After 
reaching the lowest value at 2004, those two ratios start to increase again dramatically in the 
following two years, and then some fluctuations again come through between 2006 and 2009. 
Finally, there is an obvious decreasing trend in the last three years. The similar pattern also 
applies to median leverage ratio and median net leverage ratio. At year 2004, the sharp drop 
in net leverage ratios is coupled with significant increase in average cash ratios. By examining 
the database, I find out that there are two firms whose average cash ratios have increased 
dramatically from year 2003 to 2004.  
 
As the number of analyzable data is small from 2003 to 2004, the vast increases in cash ratios 
for those two firms have also contributed to increasing the average and median cash ratios for 
the oil industry during that period. One firm is Altinex ASA and the other is DNO ASA.  
Regarding Altinex, its cash ratio has increased from 8.9% to 44.03%. Going through 
Altinex’s history, I find out that this firm in 2005 conducts a significant equity emission to 
acquire about 12% of Brage oil field from Eni S.p.A. At 2004, the firm also established two 
daughter firms in Oslo and Stavanger. Interestingly, at 2006, the firm was acquired by another 
Stavanger-based firm named Noreco. This acquisition has experienced several steps and 
eventually the transaction was completed in 2007. Opler et al. (1999) show that cash reserves 
and following acquisition are positively correlated and Harford (1999) argues that cash-rich 
firms are more likely than other firms to undertake acquisition and the acquisition by those 
firms are value decreasing, destroying seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash 
reserves held. Based on this finding, it can be inferred that Altinex held more cash by emitting 
equity from 2003 to 2004 in order to achieve an acquisition. After the acquisition, Altinex 
was then again acquired by another firm. The entire acquisition history of Altinex is 
consistent with Harford’s theory; hence it is logical to believe that the sudden increase in cash 
holdings from 2003 to 2004 is largely due to the attempt of going through an acquisition.  
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For DNO ASA, the cash ratio increased from around 5.38% to 55.70% from 2003 to 2004. By 
investigating further, DNO had sold part of its assets to the Swedish petroleum firm Lundin 
for USD 165 million in 2004. This sale of assets brought a huge amount of cash to the firm. 
Checking other financial items such as debt, net profits, tax, etc., it is reasonable to believe 
that the dramatic increase in cash ratio for DNO ASA is attributed to this asset sale decision.  
  
To examine how oil price interacts with aggregate cash ratio in Norway, I construct the Brent 
oil price growth rate 5 between 1995 and 2010. As Figure 9 illustrates, the pattern can be 
decomposed into three parts. First, the aggregate cash ratio to a greater extent follow the same 
trend as normalized Brent oil price change rate before 2005,  namely the ratio increases when 
oil price increases and the ratio decreases when the oil price drops. Second, between 2005 and 
2009, the reverse pattern can be observed, showing that ratio increases when oil price drops 
and the ratio decreases when oil price goes up. Third, at 2010, the last year of this comparison, 
we can again see that aggregate cash ratio increases together with oil price. 
 
 
                                                        5 The Brent blend oil price is based on BP: statistical review of world energy - spot crude prices.  
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Figure 9. Aggregate Cash Ratio and Brent Oil Price Growth Rate for Oil Industry. This 
sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for 
the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and 
utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Brent oil price growth rate is statistical review published by British 
Petroleum and aggregate cash ratio is based on table IV.  
3.5 Firm characteristics and cash holding in a Norwegian setting  In this section, I will study the relationship between firm characteristics and cash holdings and 
how this relationship changes over time for Norwegian firms. Staring with the regression that 
explores the how firm characteristics can explain cash holdings, I will further investigate 
whether the increase in cash holdings can be attributed to changes in firm characteristics.  
 
The literature employs several alternative definitions of the cash ratio, including 1) cash to 
assets, 2) cash to net assets ( net assets equals total assets minus cash), 3) log of cash to net 
assets, and (4) cash to sales (Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). In this paper, I will mainly use the 
most traditional measure i.e. cash to assets. In addition to this measure, I will also include 
logarithm of cash to net assets ratio. Foley et al. (2007) use the logarithm of the cash to net 
assets ratio by following method mentioned by Opler et al. (1999). This logarithm measure 
can reduce extreme outliers, which is suitable in our database.  
 
The independent variables used are mainly inspired by cash holding determinants described 
by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999) and variables used are as following: 
 
1. Sales growth. Firms with better sales growth opportunities value cash more as they are 
required to finance more projects when sales are growing.  
 
2. Firm size. It is believed that economies of scale also apply to cash holding, implying 
that a positive relation between firm size and cash holdings. 
 
3. Cash flow to assets. Being potentially exposed to lucrative investment opportunities, 
firms with better cash flow tend to hold more cash, ceteris paribus.  
4. Net working capital to assets. Net working capital measures the relationship between 
current assets and current debt and a negative relationship between NWC and cash 
holding can be expected. 
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5. Leverage. Leverage is measured as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. With a 
high amount of debt, firms can be constrained to grow; hence it is reasonable to 
believe that firms will use cash to reduce the level of debt, expecting a negative 
relation between leverage and cash holdings. Conforming to the hedging argument of 
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), constrained firms will allocate excess cash 
flows into cash holdings if their hedging needs are high, implying a positive relation 
between leverage and cash holdings. 
 
6. R&D to sales. This variable is a proxy of growth opportunities. Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (1999) argue that cost of financial distress to be larger for firms 
with high R&D expenses, since R&D expenses are a form of investment where 
information asymmetries are most important. Consequently, it should be expected that 
firms with higher R&D expenses would hold more cash.  
 
7. Industry cash flow risk (Industry sigma). Industry sigma is measured as the mean of 
standard deviation of cash flows to total assets over 5 years for firms in the same 
industry, as defined by the SN2007 code. Firms with bigger cash flow risk are inclined 
to hold more cash according to precautionary motive. 
 
8. Dividend payout dummy. A dummy variable equals to one when a firm pays dividend 
and equals zero otherwise. As previously discussed, the relationship between dividend 
payment and cash holdings is dynamic, however, it is true that firms that pay 
dividends are less risky and have greater access to external capital markets, indicating 
that the need of holding cash for precautionary motive is not that strong. 
 
9. Capital expenditure to assets. Capital expenditure is measured as difference in 
tangible assets between current year and previous year. If the increasing tangible 
assets can be used as collateral, it would increase the debt capacity, which would again 
reduce the need for holding cash. A negative relation can be expected. Furthermore, 
Riddick and White (2009) argue that a productivity shock that increases investment 
can lead to a lower level of cash. 
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The data requirements limit the size of the panel data. Both independent variable and 
dependent variables are winsorized at the 1% level before running regressions. The results are 
reported in Panel A of Table V.  Panel A of Table V consists of 8 models. Model 2 and Model 
6 use the logarithm of cash divided by net assets as dependent variable, and other models use 
cash divided by total assets as dependent variable. Model 3 and model 6 document the how 
changes in variables could impact the results of regression. The lagged change in cash and the 
lagged level of cash are included to adjust cash ratio partially to equilibrium level.  
Comparing model 3 with model 1, the significance of industry sigma is different with model 1 
being significant and model 3 being insignificant, also the sign of coefficient on sales growth 
is opposite with model 1 being positive and model 3 being negative. Model 7 use Fama-
MacBeth regression and model 8 adopts fixed effects regression. No dummy variables for 
years or industries are used in this regression. 
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Table V 
Regression Estimating the Firm Characteristics of Cash holdings 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for 
firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Taking start point in this sample data, I add other firm characteristics as dependent variables, resulting in many lost variables. The 
number of observations for regressions is smaller than the sample data. Table V includes two panels. By adding more independent variables in Panel B, more observations are 
missed due to limitation of the database, thus Panel A has more observations than Panel B. Model 2 and Model 3 in Panel B include IPO indicator variables, which are also 
relevant for firms that are listed, therefore the numbers of observations for regressions in Model 2 and Model 3 are much smaller than Model 1. Panel A include 8 models in 
which model 1 to model 6 are OLS regressions, model 7 is Fama MacBeth regression and model 8 is fixed effects regression. Dependent variables are either cash to assets or 
logarithm of cash to assets. Values in parentheses represent p-values, which are based on standard error robust to clustering by organization number. Fama-MacBeth 
regressions use Newey and West (1987) standard errors to control for autocorrelation Panel B include separate slopes and intercepts for firm-year observations from 2000 
through 2012. * indicates that the result is significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
 
Panel A 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Model OLS OLS Changes OLS OLS Changes F-M(2000s) FE 
Dependent Variable Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Cash/Assets 
                  
Intercept 0.341*** -0.661*** 0.104*** 0.332*** -0.712*** 0.099*** 0.348*** 0.088*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Lag dcash   -0.334***   -0.334***   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   Lag cash   0.747***   0.747***   
   0.000   0.000   Industry sigma 0.176** 1.807*** 0.008 0.174** 1.792*** 0.007 0.238*** -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.000) (0.81) (0.00) (0.000) (0.844) (0.001) (0.842) Sales growth 0.001 0.007* -0.001* 0.001 0.007* -0.001* 0.001 -0.001*** 
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 (0.052) (0.043) (0.016) (0.053) (0.043) (0.016) (0.119) (0.000) Real size -0.012*** -0.101*** -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.101*** -0.003*** -0.013*** 0.007*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Cash flow/assets 0.072*** 0.955*** 0.022* 0.071*** 0.952*** 0.022 0.075*** 0.109*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) (0.05) (0.000) (0.000) NWC/assets -0.228*** -1.725*** -0.122*** -0.228*** -1.723*** -0.122*** -0.230*** -0.219*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Capex -0.008* -0.03 -0.042*** -0.009** -0.032 -0.042*** -0.012** -0.032*** 
 (0.012) (0.385) 0.000 (0.008) (0.347) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 Leverage -0.218*** -1.917*** -0.075*** -0.218*** -1.917*** -0.075*** -0.213*** -0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) R&D/assets -0.137* -0.678 -0.175*** -0.139* -0.688 -0.176*** -0.110* -0.330*** 
 (0.02) (0.18) 0.00 (0.02) (0.17) (0.000) (0.04) (0.000) Dividend dummy 0.019*** 0.183*** 0.007** 0.018*** 0.181*** 0.007** 0.014 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00) (0.06) (0.000) 2000s dummy    0.010** 0.061 0.006   
    (0.006) (0.080) (0.053)   Adjusted R-squared 0.2720 0.227 0.627 0.272 0.227 0.627 0.28 0.147 
N 25455 25357 20740 25455 25357 20740 24320 25455             
 
 
40 
 
Panel B 
  1 2 3 
Model Cash/Assets Cash/Assets log(Cash/Net Assets) 
Dependent Variable Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s 
Intercept 0.396*** -0.052 0.248 0.284 -3.951 4.825 
 (0.000) (0.133) (0.302) (0.272) (0.164) (0.097) Industry sigma 0.289 -0.123 1.727*** -1.057* 16.938*** -11.567** 
 (0.203) (0.594) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.008) Sales growth 0.00200 -0.002 0.08400 -0.087 0.48900 -0.517 
 (0.076) (0.163) (0.371) (0.356) (0.697) (0.681) Real size -0.018*** 0.006* -0.018 -0.01 -0.037 -0.204 
 (0.000) (0.044) (0.185) (0.537) (0.834) (0.268) Cash flow/assets -0.012 0.084 0.077 -0.16 1.832 -1.791 
 (0.853) (0.198) (0.904) (0.807) (0.654) (0.667) NWC/assets -0.210*** -0.035 -0.023 -0.092 3.442 -4.675 
 (0.000) (0.176) (0.929) (0.726) (0.231) (0.112) Capex -0.015 0.01 0.079 -0.093 0.252 -0.218 
 (0.158) (0.365) (0.734) (0.692) (0.900) (0.914) Leverage -0.186*** -0.02 0.006 -0.16 1.191 -2.48 
 (0.000) (0.291) (0.965) (0.278) (0.553) (0.222) R&D/assets -0.537* 0.357 -1.223 1.135 -0.329 0.79 
 (0.040) (0.183) (0.256) (0.299) (0.975) (0.941) Dividend dummy 0.044 -0.027 0.114** -0.073 1.730** -1.519* 
 (0.093) (0.293) (0.001) (0.228) (0.002) (0.027) Net debt issuance  -0.015*** -0.292 0.274 -2.392 2.275 
  (0.000) (0.074) (0.092) (0.147) (0.166) Net equity issuance  0.041*** 0.115 -0.071 0.171 0.129 
  (0.000) (0.305) (0.526) (0.876) (0.906) 
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Loss dummy   -0.026  -0.098  
   (0.114)  (0.534)  T-bill   -0.001  0.126  
   (0.974)  (0.433)  Credit spread   0.005  -0.082  
   (0.779)  (0.532)  IPO1   0.01  0.046  
   (0.570)  (0.739)  IPO2   -0.002  -0.021  
   (0.812)  (0.806)  IPO3   0.004  0.018  
   (0.588)  (0.733)  IPO4   0.003  -0.02  
   (0.529)  (0.592)  IPO5   0.009*  0.066*  
   (0.027)  (0.048)  R-squared 0.286  0.297  0.307  N 21889  652  650  
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Sales growth and cash flow risk (industry sigma) have positive and significant coefficients in 
most models. Industry sigma does not have significant coefficients for model 3 and 6, and a 
negative coefficient can be observed for fixed effects regression. The coefficient of sales 
growth under Fama MacBeth regression is not significant, and the coefficients are negative in 
model 3, 6 and 8. The sign of coefficients on leverage and NWC to assets are negative and all 
of them are statistically significant, meanwhile the sign of coefficients on cash flow to assets 
is positive and significant. As mentioned previously, the leverage and cash holdings can have 
either a positive relation or negative relation; the result shows that the negative relation is 
prevalent for Norwegian sample, implying that firms with higher leverage hold more cash so 
that they use the cash to reduce constraints imposed by the high level of leverage. The 
negative relation between cash holdings and NWC to asset is also in accordance with what the 
previous conjecture. 
 
The coefficients on capital expenditure are negative and significant in most models except of 
model 2 and model 5 where dependent variable is log of cash to net assets. Pursuant to 
treating capital expenditure as collaterals, firms with higher capital expenditures would 
decrease cash demand and increase debt level; a negative relation can be expected. The results 
here also reflect such relation for Norwegian firms. 
 
Regarding real size, the sign of coefficients is negative and significant in most models with 
exception in model 8 where the sign is changed and significance remains the same, implying 
that the bigger firms are, the less cash they hold. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficients on R&D to sales are negative for Norwegian firms, differing 
from what theory suggests. Under mode 2 and model 5, the coefficients on R&D to sales are 
not significant. A potential reason for this discrepancy could be attributed to the quality of the 
data as components of R&D variable in this database could be different from the traditional 
components of R&D. Concerning dividend dummy variable, all coefficients are positive and 
significant across all models, demonstrating that a firm paying dividend has higher cash 
holdings, and this result is also consistent with the second argument proposed by Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004), suggesting that a firm which pays dividend will hold more cash to avoid the 
situation where they cannot fulfill the dividend payment duty. 
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Regression with cash to total assets as dependent variables has a higher ܴଶ than those with 
log of cash to total assets as dependent variable, indicating that using cash to total assets as 
dependent variable could better explain the variation in cash holding. Again, we can see that 
including lagged cash into regression is associated with increased ܴଶ in our sample. Model 3 
and model 6 have highest ܴଶ among all the models.  
 
I also add one indicator variable to allow for intercept shifts in 2000s since the database 
contains data only in 1990s and 2000s. In accordance with the Table V, coefficients on this 
dummy variable are positive and significant for Model 4 and Model 5, which is in alignment 
with the increasing trend in cash holdings in 2000s that cannot be explained by changes in 
firms characteristics showed by Table I. Model 6 is an re-estimating of Model 3 with addition 
of this dummy variable, and the conclusion is the same as Model 4 and Model 5. 
 
Briefly, we can see the relation between cash holding and firm characteristics is quite 
consistent across different models in Table III Panel A. Exceptions happen for fixed effects 
regression where the sign of coefficients are reverted for real size and industry sigma. Also, 
the coefficients on sales growth also vary in different models. I also include one indicator 
variable to count for intercept change in 2000s and find out that cash holdings have increased 
in 2000s in all three models, and this finding also resonates with previous increasing trend in 
cash holdings showed by Table I. 
 
Panel B is constructed to count for changes in both the intercept and slopes. Model 1 of Panel 
B is based on Model 1 of Panel, adding an indicator variable for the 2000s that interacts with 
all independent variables. Model 2 and Model 3 are variations of Model 1 by incorporating 
with several extra indicators variables. I include net debt issuance; net equity issuance, loss 
dummy, T-bill yield and credit spread measure. Net debt issuance to assets is calculated by 
using current liabilities minus previous year liability divided by total assets. Equivalently, net 
equity issuance is equal to the difference between current total equity and previous total 
equity divided by total assets. T-bill yield is an American parameter based on the average 3-
month rate published by Federal Reserve St. Louis. Similarly, the credit spread is the 
difference between AAA and BAA bonds from Federal Reserve. By adding five IPO indicator 
variables, the intent is to examine the intuition that capital raising comes usually in a big 
amount and firms should hold more cash immediately after raising capital and the cash 
holding should increase over time. Model 3 is similar with Model 2 except for using log of 
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cash to net assets as the dependent variable. Noticeably, Model 2 and Model 3 only include 
public firms, i.e. the variable listing = 1, since it makes logical sense to exclude private firms 
when running regressions that include IPO variables. 6  
 
Starting with Model 1, the sign of coefficients remain unchanged for leverage, cash flow to 
assets and NWC to assets. Only coefficients on NWC to assets and leverage at 1990s are 
significant among those three variables, and the coefficients all become insignificant at 2000s 
with interaction variables. Regarding industry sigma, the coefficient is positive and significant 
at 1990s and the sign becomes reverse and insignificant at 2000s. Similarly, the coefficient on 
sales growth follows the same pattern, becoming trivially negative and insignificant at 2000s. 
Clearly, there is a negative and significant relation between cash holding and real size at 
1990s, and this relation turns to be positive, remaining significant at 2000s. This shows 
inconsistency with transaction motive, which implying that large firms hold less cash. A 
potential explanation could be associated with agency reasons, namely managers will hold 
more cash when the organization becomes larger. Considering the relation between capital 
expenditure and cash holdings, it also follows the same pattern as real size; however, the 
relation turns insignificant at 2000s. With respect to Model 1 in Panel A, the relation between 
R&D to sales and cash holdings is negative and significant, which is also the case at Panel B. 
Nevertheless, the relation becomes insignificant and negative at 2000s. 
 
Looking at Model 2, in 1990s the relation between industry sigma and cash ratios is positive 
and insignificant; however, it turns negative and insignificant in 2000s. The same changes 
have also happened to sales growth.  The coefficient on real size is negative and significant in 
1990s and it, however, become positive and insignificant in 2000s. Markedly, the sign of 
coefficient on NWC to assets are negative and significant for 1990s and 2000s, which also 
resonates with results from Panel A. Concerning coefficients on capital expenditure and R&D 
to assets; both are positive and insignificant in 1990s and become negative and insignificant 
in 2000s. For leverage, the coefficients are negative for both 1990s and 2000s; however, it is 
significant in 1990s and insignificant in 2000s. For dividend payment, the coefficient is 
positive in 1990s and negative in 2000s, however, both are insignificant. For net debt issuance, 
                                                        
6 An unreported approach has been tried to find better sample for Model 2 and Model 3, which is to use the 
firms that have ever been listed, and the results produced differ significantly from what theory suggests, hence 
the approach is not adopted. 
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a negative correlation with cash ratios can be observed in both 1990s and 2000s; however, the 
coefficient is only significant in 2000s. Regarding net equity issuance, the coefficients are 
positive for both 1990s and 200s, and it is only significant in 2000s too.  
 
From a transaction point of view, if the risk-free rate decreases, the cost of holding cash will 
also decrease, expecting a positive relation between cash holdings and T-bill yield, which is 
also the not case for the Norwegian sample. Contrastingly, an increase in credit spread will 
lead to an increase in default risk, which again will increase precautionary demand for cash, 
which is confirmed in the Norwegian sample according to Model 2 in Panel B. With respect 
to IPO indicators variables, the results are not in accordance with the suggested intuition since 
the signs of coefficients change irregularly. 
 
The third model in Panel B has log of the ratio of cash to net assets as dependent variable. 
Model 3 to a large extent resembles Model 2 with some noticeable differences. First, the sign 
of coefficients on capital expenditures are reverse compared to Model 2 with unchanged 
significance. Second, the coefficient on leverage in Model 3 is positive in 1990s and negative 
in 2000s whereas both coefficients are negative in Model 2. Regarding T-bill, a positive and 
insignificant relation can be observed. Nevertheless, a negative and insignificant correlation 
can also be found for coefficient on credit spread, which is not in alignment with common 
intuition. For the IPO variables, despite insignificance, we can find that the suggested 
intuition is better reflected in Model 3 where the coefficients gradually reduce when IPO 
becomes more distant.  
 
In Panel B, the majority of results for Model 2 and Model 3 are insignificant and this is 
probably because of the size of the sample data. With exclusion of all private firms, the 
remaining data size consists of only 652 firms for Model 2 and 650 for Model 3. Enlarging 
the sample size, which is not achievable in this dataset, could potentially alleviate the 
insignificant results for most coefficients.  
3.6 Financial constraints and cash holding for Norwegian firms   
Table V Panel A has also examined how firm characteristics interact with cash holdings for 
Norwegian firms. One of those independent variables is dividend payment, which is also a 
financial constraint measurement according to literature. As Panel A shows, dividend 
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payment variable is positively correlated with cash ratios and all coefficients are significant. 
Seen from a financial constraint perspective, a dividend-paying firm, which is considered to 
be less financially constrained, should hold less cash. Nevertheless, there are other forces 
explained by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) that pull the opposite direction, for instance, dividend 
payment is a commitment to shareholders and firms could hold more cash to fulfil this 
commitment. In this setting, the case in point could be that the ability to fulfill dividend 
payment duty takes a dominating role when it comes to interplay between cash holdings and 
dividend payment.  
 
In addition to dividend payment, I construct two financial constraint (Whited-Wu index and 
Hadlock-Pierce index) measurements in order to examine how they affect cash holdings for 
Norwegian firms, and I exclude KZ index because of the incompleteness of dataset where 
there is a lack of essential component for KZ index’s construction.  
 
By adding Whited-Wu index, Table VI (A) is conducted in a similar way as Panel A in Table 
V. I replace dividend dummy variable with WW index since dividend payment has also been 
considered as a financial constraint measurement and other variables such as industry sigma, 
sales growth, real size, cash flow to assets, etc. are included as other independent variables.  
 
As Table VI (A) shows, there are also 8 Models in this panel. Dependent variables are both 
ratio of cash to assets and the log of the ratio of cash to assets. It can be observed that WW 
index has a trivially negative correlation with cash ratios and they are significant in all 
Models except for Model 8 where fixed effects regression is conducted. The results also share 
similarities with Panel A to a great extent; the correlations between cash ratios and other 
independent variables are extremely comparable to Panel A. In terms ofܴଶ, Model 3 and 
Model 6 where lag cash variable and 2000s dummy variable are included have highest ܴଶ at 
62.70%, showing that those two Models explain regression better. Fixed effect regression has 
lowest ܴଶ at 14.56%.
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Table VI (A) 
Regressions Estimating the Financial Constraint Index (Whited-Wu Index) of Cash Holdings 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for 
firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Taking start point in this sample data, I add other firm characteristics as dependent variables, resulting in many lost variables. The 
number of observations for regressions is smaller than the sample data. Panel A include 8 models in which model 1 to model 6 are OLS regressions, model 7 is Fama 
MacBeth regression and model 8 is fixed effects regression. Dependent variables are either cash to assets or logarithm of cash to assets. Values in parentheses represent p-
values, which are based on standard error robust to clustering by organization number. Fama-MacBeth regressions use Newey and West (1987) standard errors to control for 
autocorrelation Panel B include separate slopes and intercepts for firm-year observations from 2000 through 2012. * indicates that the result is significant at 10% level, ** 
significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
WW Index 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Model OLS OLS Changes OLS OLS Changes F-M(2000s) FE 
Dependent Variable Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Cash/Assets 
                  
Intercept 0.341*** -0.644*** 0.104*** 0.332*** -0.702*** 0.099*** 0.347*** 0.077*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Lag dcash   -0.334***   -0.333***   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   Lag cash   0.746***   0.746***   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   Industry sigma 0.170** 1.767*** 0.006 0.168** 1.751*** 0.004 0.240*** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.869) (0.006) (0.000) (0.904) (0.001) (0.838) Sales growth 0.001 0.007* -0.001* 0.001 0.007* -0.001* 0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.057) (0.044) (0.015) (0.057) (0.044) (0.015) (0.130) (0.000) Real size -0.011*** -0.100*** -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.100*** -0.003*** -0.012*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Cash flow/assets 0.070*** 0.938*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.935*** 0.021 0.074*** 0.103*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) NWC/assets -0.229*** -1.730*** -0.122*** -0.228*** -1.728*** -0.122*** -0.230*** -0.219*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Capex -0.008* -0.024 -0.042*** -0.008* -0.027 -0.042*** -0.012** -0.032*** 
 (0.019) (0.473) 0.000 (0.013) (0.422) 0.000 (0.006) 0.000 Leverage -0.220*** -1.932*** -0.076*** -0.219*** -1.931*** -0.076*** -0.214*** -0.092*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) R&D/assets -0.147* -0.766 -0.178*** -0.148* -0.776 -0.179*** -0.115* -0.332*** 
 (0.011) (0.126) 0.000 (0.010) (0.121) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) WW Index -0.000** -0.001 -0.000* -0.000** -0.001 -0.000* -0.000* 0 
 (0.007) (0.057) (0.024) (0.008) (0.059) (0.025) (0.012) (0.512) 2000s dummy    0.011** 0.070* 0.006*   
    (0.002) (0.043) (0.039)   Adjusted R-squared 0.271 0.226 0.627 0.271 0.226 0.627 0.279 0.146 
N 25584 25484 20856 25584 25484 20856 24449 25584  
Table VI (B) 
Regressions Estimating the Financial Constraint Index (Hadlock and Pierce Index) of Cash Holdings 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for 
firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Taking start point in this sample data, I add other firm characteristics as dependent variables, resulting in many lost variables. The 
number of observations for regressions is smaller than the sample data. Panel A include 8 models in which model 1 to model 6 are OLS regressions, model 7 is Fama 
MacBeth regression and model 8 is fixed effects regression. Dependent variables are either cash to assets or logarithm of cash to assets. Values in parentheses represent p-
values, which are based on standard error robust to clustering by organization number. Fama-MacBeth regressions use Newey and West (1987) standard errors to control for 
autocorrelation Panel B include separate slopes and intercepts for firm-year observations from 2000 through 2012.  
 
HP Index 
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  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Model OLS OLS Changes OLS OLS Changes F-M(2000s) FE 
Dependent Variable Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Log(Cash/Net Assets) Cash/Assets Cash/Assets Cash/Assets 
                  
Intercept 0.171*** -2.180*** 0.057*** 0.164*** -2.218*** 0.052*** 0.163*** 0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Lag dcash   -0.335***   -0.335***   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   Lag cash   0.751***   0.751***   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   Industry sigma 0.213*** 2.196*** 0.018 0.212*** 2.189*** 0.017 0.277*** -0.017 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.600) (0.001) (0.000) (0.622) (0.000) (0.571) Sales growth 0.000 0.003 -0.001** 0.000 0.003 -0.001** 0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.476) (0.350) (0.005) (0.482) (0.352) (0.005) (0.672) (0.006) Cash flow/assets 0.071*** 0.948*** 0.023* 0.071*** 0.946*** 0.022* 0.076*** 0.106*** 
 0.000 0.000 (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) NWC/assets -0.235*** -1.792*** -0.123*** -0.235*** -1.791*** -0.123*** -0.237*** -0.217*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Capex -0.012*** -0.057 -0.043*** -0.012*** -0.059 -0.043*** -0.016** -0.024*** 
 (0.001) (0.094) (0.000) (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) Leverage -0.229*** -2.003*** -0.077*** -0.229*** -2.003*** -0.077*** -0.223*** -0.091*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) R&D/assets -0.122* -0.528 -0.171*** -0.123* -0.533 -0.171*** -0.087 -0.326*** 
 (0.032) (0.283) (0.000) (0.031) (0.278) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) HP Index -0.010*** -0.101*** -0.003*** -0.010*** -0.101*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 2000s dummy    0.007 0.039 0.005   
    -0.053 -0.261 -0.101   Adjusted R-squared 0.261 0.218 0.626 0.261 0.218 0.626 0.268 0.146 
N 25612 25512 20881 25612 25512 20881 24477 25612 
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Equivalently, I conduct the same regressions for cash ratios and HP index. Since real size is 
one variable that is used to construct HP index, I exclude real size variable to achieve a better 
result of correlation between HP index and cash ratios. As Table VI (B) shows, HP index has 
a stronger negative correlation with cash ratios compared to WW index, and all coefficients 
are negative and significant, meaning that HP index has a negative impact on cash ratios. 
Regarding other independent variables, the correlations between cash ratios and those 
independent variables are similar to Panel A. ଶof Model 3 and Model 6 is also highest 
among all Models.  
 
Table VI shows how financial constraints measurements interact with cash holdings 
controlling for a series of firm characteristics variables. According to those two panels, a 
clear-cut observation is that financial constraint variables are negatively correlated with cash 
ratios across all Models and all coefficients are significant except for one in fixed effects 
regression in Table VI (A). A conclusion can be drawn here is that a financially constrained 
firm has more cash holdings compared to a non-financial constrained one based on evidence 
from regressions in Table VI. This is, however, inconsistent with what theory suggest. 
Accroding to theory, a financially constrained firm will hold more cash than a non-financially 
constrained firm. The explanation could be that there is a mis-measurement of those two 
financial constraint indices, which is also an issue recently discussed in Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist (2013). 
 
Another observation is that HP index serves as a better financial constraint measurement 
compared to WW index. A feasible explanation is that components of HP index are real size 
and age, which are determined by the firm itself and cannot be changed by the firm; whereas 
components of WW index include, for instance, sales growths, cash flow to assets, long-term 
debt to total asset, etc., which could be changed by the firm in a short run. 
 
In light of Panel B of Table V, I also interact indicator variable for 2000s with HP index and 
WW index in order to see how financial constraint measurements impact cash holdings over 
time. As Table VII (A) (In Appendix) shows, the correlations between WW index and cash 
holdings are not significant despite the signs have changed in Model 1 and Model 2. By 
creating the identical interaction variables for HP index, Table VII (B) (In Appendix) shows 
that both coefficients on HP index are negative and insignificant for Model 1. Recognizably, 
in Model 2, the coefficient on HP index is positive and significant in 1990s and it turns to 
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negative and significant in 2000s in Model 2, indicating that the negative impact HP index 
imposes on cash ratios is mainly caused in 2000s. In Model 3, the exact trend occurs again 
with coefficient being positive in 1990s and negative in 2000s, hence it can conclude that the 
negative correlation between HP index and cash ratios is more attributable to 2000s in spite of 
insignificance.  
 
Referring back to hypothesis 1, which takes starting point in the intuition that financially 
constrained firms will hold more cash as raising external capital becomes more difficult for 
them than unconstrained firms, the evidence from OLS and other regressions by using two 
financial constraint measurements shows that the hypothesis is not true in Norwegian setting. 
In addition to potential mis-measurement of those two financial constraint indices suggested 
by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013), it could also be attributed to endogeneity problem that 
OLS regressions suffer, which will be elaborated in next session. 
3.7 Cash holding changes in the event of listing and delisting  
In previous section, I examine how financial constraints affect cash holdings for Norwegian 
firms by using two indices based on OLS and other regressions. The results produced 
demonstrate that financial constraint measurements are negatively correlated with cash 
holdings. Despite the results confirm my first hypothesis; it is worthy pointing out that there 
are several pitfalls of OLS regression methods, which could potentially lead to skewed 
conclusions.  
 
The first shortcoming of OLS regression is omitted variable bias (OVB). The regression 
formulas used are not comprehensive and could not possibly include all independent variables 
that could correlate with cash ratio. The identified independent variables are based on the 
classical determinants for cash holdings suggested by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson 
(1999). The cash holding determinants have covered the most critical components that affect 
the cash holding situation for a firm, however, they might be other variables which could also 
be correlated with cash holdings. For instance, corporate governance can determine how 
much cash a firm should hold. With stringent corporate governance, national authorities could 
purposely increase threshold of cash holdings for firms in certain industry, resulting in 
increase of cash holdings. Possibly, stock performance could also be correlated with cash 
holdings. With gradually increasing stock performance, a firm receives higher public 
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appreciation and shares a profitable outlook, making it easier for a firm to get external 
funding; hence the cash holding could reduce. More thorough research needs to be done in 
order to uphold or refute those conjectures, yet the focal point is that omitted variables in OLS 
regressions could lead to inaccurate predications, which deviate from the reality.  
 
A consequence of omitted variable bias is endogeneity problem. Endogenous variables are 
correlated with other variables (both independent and dependent) in a regression. Although it 
is difficult to quantify, the firm’s reputation and goodwill could probably be an endogenous 
variable, which affect both a firm’s cash holdings and financial constraint situation. For 
instance, a firm with stellar rating and outstanding reputation shall encounter little hindrance 
when it comes to raising fund, indicating that such a firm is not financially constrained; 
meanwhile this firm would have also achieved solidly financial performance, providing a 
resourceful way to hoard cash. Those correlations are hardly reported in an OLS regression, 
which could lead to endogeneity problem. A possible solution to overcome omitted variable 
bias is to introduce instrument or proxy variables for the omitted variables, however, since the 
assumption of this approach is very strong and they are hardly practical. Another commonly 
used method is fixed effects method, which is also used in previous regressions.  
 
The second pitfall of OLS regression rests on the fact that it is not able to conduct 
comparisons within a firm over time. The purpose of OLS regression is to conduct 
comparisons in a cross-sectional setting. In other words, the OLS regressions used aim to see 
how firm financial constraint measurement affects cash holdings across different firms instead 
of examining the situation for the same firm. Undoubtedly, there are many distinctive traits of 
every firm, which are hard to measure and identify. For example, different firms might have 
different sizes, sales growths, and cash flows etc. Also, they might be located in entirely 
different industries, which make it extremely difficult to draw precise conclusions when 
comparing one with the other.   
 
Realizing the pitfalls of results yielded by OLS regressions, I conduct two event studies to 
examine how cash holdings change for firms within a given time framework. The first event 
study will explore how cash ratios change for firms that have been listed. I study the how cash 
ratios change 5 years before IPO and 5 years after IPO in Norwegian setting. The second 
event study shares the same methodology, investigating how cash ratios change 5 years 
before delisting and 5 years after. By conducting those two event studies, it allows me to see 
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how cash ratios change within firms over time instead of achieving cross-sectional results 
yielded by OLS regressions, making it clearer to see how the real changes in cash ratios 
unfold for specific firms. Listing and delisting are two external shocks, imitating the external 
effects of financial constraint measurements. The advantage of using two external financial 
constraint measurements is that it can circumvent obstacles set by OLS regressions regarding 
omitted variable bias and endogeneity problem.  
 
Public firms and private firms differ in several different ways. Gao, Hsu and Li (2013) find 
that public firms generate more patents than private firms and the patents of public firms are 
more exploitive (i.e., mainly making use of existing knowledge) and less exploratory (i.e., 
pursuing new knowledge) than the patents of private firms, and their conclude that short-
termism associated with public equity markets contributes to an exploitative innovation 
strategy. They further add that public firms are required to disclose more transparent than 
private firms concerning information environment and CEOs of public firms are more likely 
to be professional managers whereas CEOs of private firms are more likely to be 
entrepreneurs. Some more differences pointed out by Gao, Hsu and Li (2013) cover different 
life cycles public firms and private firms are located in. Public firms try more aggressively to 
commercialize their ideas and products than private firms. Moreover, public firms are more 
active than private firms in merger and acquisition transactions (Maksimovic, et al., 2013) 
 
In addition to those differences, two previous studies have examined how borrowing cost and 
power change after a firm gets listed. Pagano et al. (1998) and Schenone (2010) examined the 
going-public decisions for Italian firms and they conclude that the borrowing cost decreases 
after those firms go public. Similarly, Schenone (2010) studies a panel of U.S firms and the 
conclusion is that the borrowing-cost bargaining power increases after IPO. Anthony and 
Sascha (2011) identify that private firms pay on average 27-bps-higher loan spreads than 
public firms, which is considered as a significant loan cost disadvantage.  
 
Aforementioned differences between public firms and private firms could also have some 
impacts on cash holding situation, especially different borrowing costs.  More importantly, 
when the transition from a public firm to a private firm entails a thorough alteration in 
information environment, namely a public firm discloses more information than a private 
firm. Gao, Hsu and Li (2013) argue that greater information disclosure could reduce 
asymmetric information problem between corporate insiders and outsiders, which also could 
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reduce the financing cost and the likelihood of the firm being undervalued by stock market, 
diminishing the possibility of being taken over. Furthermore, Anthony and Sascha (2011) 
further confirm that information opacity, especially the information opacity associated with 
firm’s being private, has first-order importance on the cost of borrowing debt. Intuitively, 
public firms which face lower borrowing costs will hold less cash whereas private firms with 
higher borrowing costs will hold more cash. While recognizing those differences, the two 
crafted event studies will analyze how cash holdings change for firms that either go public or 
go private. 
 
Figure 10. Cash Ratio, IPO and Sales Growth.  This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. This figure examines how cash ratio and sales growth rate change before and after listing.   
Referring to hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3, theoretically, when a firm is listed, its access to 
public access is widened and it becomes less financially constrained, therefore its cash 
holding will most likely to reduce. Correspondingly, when a firm is delisted, its access to 
public funding is significantly limited, making it hard for the firm to raise external capital. In 
this case, the firm is more financially constrained, and its cash holding will more likely to 
increase. As Figure 10 shows, prior to IPO, the average cash ratio of firms has experienced an 
increasing trend, meaning that firms hold more cash before they go public. The average cash 
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ratio has increased from 15% to 20% before IPO. Nevertheless, when it becomes listed, the 
cash ratio has encountered a sharp decrease, falling below 15%, and 4 years after IPO, the 
average cash ratio has again had a minor increase. Taking a look at median cash ratio, it to a 
great extent follows the same trend as average cash ratio. In Figure 10, I also include the 
average sales growth to probe how cash ratios change with respect to sales growth. Clearly, 
after being listed, the sales growth has increased greatly, which reflects that it moves towards 
the opposite direction compared to cash ratios. As showed in Panel A in Table V, the 
coefficients on sales growth are positive for OLS regressions, indicating that cash ratios will 
increase when sales growth increases, however, in this event study, an opposite conclusion is 
reached. Potentially explanations could be tow fold; 1). OLS regression fails to distill the 
exact cash development within firms and the event study explores the trend specifically 
within a firm, hence it is natural to have difference. 2). The reduced cash holdings could be 
more attributed to the fact that IPO changes the financial constraint status of a firm and it is 
easier for them to raise external capital now, hence they reduce cash holdings. Seemingly, the 
second force takes a dominating role. Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms will reduce cash 
holdings after being listed, and this event study confirms this hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 11. Cash Ratio, Delisting and Sales Growth.  This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 
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plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. This table examines how cash ratio and sales growth rate change before and after delisting.  
According to Figure 11, the average cash ratio decreases prior to delisting and it starts with 
around 12% 5 years before delisting and it ends up with around 8% right before delisting. 
After delisting, a positive trend in average cash ratio can be spotted and the average cash ratio 
has increased to around 14% 5 years after delisting. Median cash ratio has similar 
development as average cash ratio before delisting with lower values. After delisting, the 
median cash ratio follows an increasing trend with some fluctuations; however, from year 4 to 
year 5, this ratio has increased from 5% to around 13%. Regarding average sales growth, it 
has been stable for most years except for some sudden changes around delisting event and 
there is no real pattern to be observed between average sales growth and cash ratios for 
delisting.  
 
As Figure 11 suggests, the average cash ratio increases after delisting, which could be 
partially explained by financial constraint argument. When a firm becomes delisted, the firm 
status has changed from being public to private, which truncate the access to external capital 
market. In terms of the financing sources, private firms face more financing frictions than 
public firms and they mainly depend on debt financing (Brav, 2009; Gao, Harford, and Li, 
2013). The consequence is that the firm gets financially constrained, which again would 
propel the cash holding desire. This argument is imbedded in hypothesis 3 and I can therefore 
conclude that the hypothesis 3 is confirmed by the evidence from this event study.  
 
Another argument rests on how monitoring mechanism works for public and private firms. 
On one hand, being public, a firm is exposed to public shareholder monitoring. Since public 
shareholders are widely dispersed, they are not equipped with strong enough power to 
monitor how managers perform and operate the firm. Simultaneously, a private firm is tightly 
monitored by a less disperse group of shareholders who have stronger power to follow how 
managers steer the firm. The transition from public firm to private firm entails stronger 
monitoring power according to this perspective.  Michael Jensen (1986) argues that managers 
with abundant free cash flow can increase dividend payment or buy back stock to consume 
cash that would otherwise be invested in low-return projects and he further argues that debt 
enables managers to bond their promise to pay out future cash flows, hence serving at 
substitute for dividends.  
 
 
 
57 
With stronger monitoring, a firm should reduce cash holdings according to Jensen’s view 
with one precondition specifying that there are not enough lucrative investment opportunities 
available.  Strong monitoring makes it hard for managers to misuse cash for their own 
interests and they are required to either invest the extra cash in profitable projects to achieve 
higher returns or distribute cash as dividends to shareholders. Interestingly, the evidence from 
the second event study contradicts what Michael Jensen suggests as I can see that cash 
holdings increase after a firm becomes private for this sample.  
 
It is very arbitrary to say that this result is able to overthrow theory suggested by Michael 
Jensen; however, I can interpret the result with precaution by revealing two possible reasons 
why such discrepancy exists. First, while it is believed that monitoring should decrease when 
a firm becomes private, however, it will not necessarily be the case. With presence of publicly 
external monitoring forces such as media monitoring and authoritative monitoring, a public 
firm does not necessarily face weaker monitoring compared to a private firm. If monitoring 
does not increase when a firm becomes private, the cash holding situation would most likely 
remain the same and it will not decrease. More radically, if external forces disappear and the 
monitoring force incurred by shareholder is not strong enough to compensate the 
disappearance of external monitoring, it could contribute to decreasing monitoring forces. In 
this case, the cash holdings would increase just as the evidence demonstrates in this sample.  
 
Second, one precondition ensuring that a strong monitoring force leads to lower cash holdings 
is lack of good investment opportunities. In this sample, it could be the case where there are 
sufficient good investment opportunities; hence the firm will hold more cash in order to invest 
in those profitable projects. Those two reasons could justify the occurred discrepancy between 
Michael Jensen’s theory and the evidence from event study, leaving plenty of places for 
further research and discussion.  
 
The purpose of those two event studies is to overcome shortcomings incurred by using OLS 
regressions. My findings are a going-public private firm will decrease cash holdings after 
being listed and a going-private public firm will increase cash holdings after being delisted. 
The potential discrepancies have also been explained with respect to the theory suggested by 
Michael Jensen. Also, the results resonate with the laid hypotheses in this paper.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
I document a moderate increase in cash holdings for Norwegian firms from 1995 to 2012 in 
aggregate cash ratio and a stable yet minor fluctuation in average cash ratio. I also show that 
aggregate cash ratio of Norwegian firms is negatively correlated with macroeconomic 
parameters. In a Norwegian setting, private firms hold more cash than public firms. Dividend-
paying firms hold more cash than non-dividend-paying firms. 
 
Regarding the average aggregate cash ratio for specific industries, a minor decrease trend can 
be observed for fishing industry, whereas a minor increase trend is showed for oil industry. 
Dividend payment, being considered as a financial constraint measurement is positively 
correlated with cash holdings in the Norwegian sample. Two financial constraint 
measurements (WW index and HP index) are negatively correlated with cash holding, which 
disapproves hypothesis 1, saying that a financially constrained firm will hold more cash. The 
potential explanation for this inconsistency could be the mis-measurement of financial 
constraint indices discussed by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013) and potential endogeneity 
problem OLS regressions suffer. 
 
Private firms and public firms differ in several ways, and the cash holding situation is also 
different. Two event studies show that a going-public private firm will decrease cash holdings 
after being listed and a going-private public firm will increase cash holdings. From a financial 
constraint perspective, a public firm has wider access to external capital market, thus it is less 
financially constrained compared to a private firm. Being less financially constrained also 
entails the need for holding less cash. Also, a private firm faces higher borrowing costs, 
which could potentially curtail its ability to get external funding, thus it is more likely that a 
going-private public firm will hold more cash to resist aforementioned hindrances when it 
goes private. 
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Appendix  
Variable Definitions List 
 
Cash ratio: the ratio of cash and other equivalent marketable securities to the book value of 
total assets. 
 
Leverage: the ratio of long-term debt to the book value of total assets. 
 
Net Leverage: the ratio of difference between debt and cash to the book value of total assets. 
 
Dividend Dummy: a dummy variable denoting the dividend payment status of firms. 1 
denotes paying dividend and 0 means the opposite. 
 
Listing: a dummy variable indicating whether a firm is listed on Oslo Stock Exchange or not. 
1 means that the firm is listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and 0 indicates the opposite. 
 
Net Income: a dummy variable measuring the results of net income. Net Income is equal to 0 
if net income is negative and it is equal to 1 if net income is not negative. 
 
Cash Flow: EBIDTA - Interest - taxes - common dividends 
 
Industry sigma: the mean of the standard deviation of cash flows/total assets over 5 years for 
firms in the same industry, as defined by the SN2007 code 
 
Sales growth: the annual sales growth for each firm 
 
Real size: the natural log of the book value of total assets 
 
NWC: calculated as net working capital minus cash and cash equivalents 
 
Capex: the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Capital expenditures are calculated as 
the tangible assets difference between two years. 
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Leverage: the ratio of total debt to the total assets, where debt is equal to the sum of long-
term debt and current liabilities. 
 
R&D/assets: the ratio of research and development expenses to total assets 
 
T-bill: the U.S Treasury bill yield measured as the average 3-month rate published by the 
Federal Reserve St. Louise 
 
IPO1 through IPO5: Dummy variables equal to one if the firm went public 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 
years ago. 
Loss: A dummy variable equal to one if net come is less than zero, and zero otherwise 
 
Net debt issuance: Calculated as current liabilities minus previous year liabilities, divided by 
total assets 
 
Net equity issuance: Calculated as current total equity minus previous year total equity, 
divided by total assets 
 
Credit spread: The difference between the AAA and BAA yields published by the Federal 
Reserve St. Louise 
 
2000s dummy: A dummy variable equal to one if the years are equal or above 2000, and zero 
otherwise 
 
WW Index: An index is constructed following Whited and Wu (2006) and Hennessy and 
Whited (2007) as -0.091[(cash flow/total assets)]-0.06[dividend indicator] +0.021[long-term 
debt/total assets]-0.044[log (total assets)] + 0.102*(industry sales growth0-0.035*(sales 
growth] 
 
HP Index: an index is constructed following Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as -
0.737Size+0.043ܵ݅ݖ݁ଶ-0.040Age, where Size is Real size equaling the log of book value of 
total assets. Age is equal to year minus incorporation year 
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This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive 
values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 
to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a 
panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. Firms are sorted into quintiles based on value of total 
assets. The first quintile (Q1) represents the smallest firms, while the fifth quintile (Q5) represents the largest 
firms in this sample. 
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Figure 4. Median Net Leverage Ratio by Firm Size Quintile from 1995 to 2012
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Figure 7 . Cash Ratios and Leverage Ratios for Fishing Industry. This sample includes all
observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of
total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007
code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 66796 observations
for 17558 unique firms. This figure illustrates development of aggregate cash ratio, average cash rat io, median
cash ratio, average leverage ratio and median leverage ratio for fishing industry in Norway.
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Table II (B) 
Median Cash Ratios from 1995 to 2012 Delineated by Firm Status and the Payments of 
Dividends in Norway 
This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive 
values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 
to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a 
panel with 66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. A private firm is not registered at Oslo Stock Exchange. 
A public firm has done IPO and is currently available on Oslo Stock Exchange. A firm is classified as dividend 
payer if the firm pays dividend in the year. 
 Firm Status Dividend Status Accounting Performance Year Private Public Non-dividend payer Dividend Payer Nonnegative Net Income Negative Net Income 
1995 0.0857 0.0881 0.0770 0.1206 0.0994 0.0552 
1996 0.0863 0.0713 0.0768 0.1251 0.1015 0.0529 
1997 0.0866 0.0844 0.0788 0.1197 0.0983 0.0584 
1998 0.0796 0.0674 0.0720 0.1174 0.0959 0.0507 
1999 0.0801 0.0715 0.0791 0.1331 0.0928 0.0589 
2000 0.0746 0.0591 0.0729 0.1425 0.0838 0.0564 
2001 0.0759 0.0632 0.0743  0.0922 0.0535 2002 0.0797 0.0742 0.0794 0.0369 0.0933 0.0565 
2003 0.0882 0.0932 0.0877 0.1126 0.1063 0.0569 
2004 0.0936 0.1135 0.0949 0.0862 0.1011 0.0725 
2005 0.0967 0.1226 0.0971 0.1079 0.1068 0.0638 
2006 0.0953 0.1011 0.0945 0.1091 0.1090 0.0564 
2007 0.1005 0.0953 0.0975 0.1239 0.1113 0.0635 
2008 0.0938 0.0706 0.0876 0.1341 0.1182 0.0616 
2009 0.1017 0.0852 0.0953 0.1335 0.1175 0.0634 
2010 0.0973 0.0928 0.0942 0.1270 0.1198 0.0608 
2011 0.0934 0.0777 0.0882 0.1351 0.1141 0.0576 
2012 0.0882 0.0889 0.0851 0.1212 0.1052 0.0557 
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Table VII (A) Regressions Estimating the Financial Constraint Index (Whited and Wu Index) of Cash Holdings with Interaction Variable This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for 
firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. I use dummy variable d_2000s to interact with WW index variable and include also other variables that appear in Table V and 
Table VI.* indicates that the result is significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
WW Index 
  1 2 3 
Model Cash/Assets Cash/Assets log(Cash/Net Assets) 
Dependent Variable Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s 
Intercept 0.331*** 0.012** 0.390*** 0.032 -0.353 0.26 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.065) (0.534) (0.198) Industry sigma 0.168**  0.409*  3.392  
 (0.006)  (0.042)  (0.056)  Sales growth 0.001  -0.001  -0.009  
 (0.057)  (0.373)  (0.422)  Real size -0.012***  
-0.018***  
-0.154***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  Cash flow/assets 0.070***  -0.01  0.644  
 (0.000)  (0.876)  (0.200)  NWC/assets -0.228***  
-0.138***  -1.097**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  Capex -0.008*  -0.001  -0.088  
 (0.013)  (0.963)  (0.340)  Leverage -0.219***  
-0.156***  -1.117**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  R&D/assets -0.148*  0.079  1.534  
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 (0.010)  (0.593)  (0.188)  WW Index 0 0 0 0 0 -0.001 
 (0.370) (0.130) (0.755) (0.895) (0.983) (0.957) Net debt issuance   
-0.019***  -0.117**  
   (0.000)  (0.006)  Net equity issuance   0.041***  0.294***  
   (0.000)  (0.000)  Loss dummy   -0.02  -0.081  
   (0.072)  (0.442)  T-bill   -0.015  0.003  
   (0.258)  (0.981)  Credit spread   0.014  -0.002  
   (0.198)  (0.985)  IPO1   0.01  -0.017  
   (0.593)  (0.917)  IPO2   -0.001  -0.017  
   (0.923)  (0.843)  IPO3   0.008  0.041  
   (0.213)  (0.442)  IPO4   0.002  -0.038  
   (0.665)  (0.360)  IPO5   0.006  0.037  
   (0.130)  (0.280)  R-squared 0.271  0.217  0.177  N 25584  1119  1110  
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 Table VII (B) Regressions Estimating the Financial Constraint Index (Hadlock and Pierce Index) of Cash Holdings with Interaction Variable This sample includes all observations from Norwegian Corporate Account from 1995 to 2012 with positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for 
firms in Norway. Financial firms (SN2007 code 64 to 69) and utilities (SN2007 code 35 to 39 plus code 4399 and 8129) are excluded from the sample, yielding a panel with 
66796 observations for 17558 unique firms. I use dummy variable d_2000s to interact with HP index variable and include also other variables that appear in Table V and 
Table VI.* indicates that the result is significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level and ***significant at 1% level. 
HP Index 
  1 2 3 
Model Cash/Assets Cash/Assets log(Cash/Net Assets) 
Dependent Variable Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 2000s 
Intercept 0.324*** 0.005 0.446*** 0.042 0.251 0.119 
 (0.000) (0.720) (0.000) (0.210) (0.748) (0.790) Industry sigma 0.174**  0.372  3.16  
 (0.004)  (0.064)  (0.075)  Sales growth 0.001  -0.001  -0.01  
 (0.053)  (0.374)  (0.409)  Real size -0.011***  -0.021***  -0.175***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  `  Cash flow/assets 0.069***  -0.007  0.654  
 (0.000)  (0.912)  (0.189)  NWC/assets -0.229***  -0.137***  -1.091**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  Capex -0.008*  0  -0.076  
 (0.014)  (0.992)  (0.406)  Leverage -0.218***  -0.156***  -1.118**  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  R&D/assets -0.143*  0.069  1.421  
 (0.013)  (0.643)  (0.227)  
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HP Index -0.001 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.091 -0.034 
 (0.794) (0.608) (0.692) (0.714) (0.494) (0.792) Net debt issuance   -0.019***  -0.119**  
   (0.000)  (0.006)  Net equity issuance   0.041***  -0.12  
   (0.000)  (0.749)  Loss dummy   -0.02  -0.069  
   (0.082)  (0.515)  T-bill   -0.014  0.002  
   (0.266)  (0.988)  Credit spread   0.014  0  
   (0.199)  (0.997)  IPO1   0.007  -0.046  
   (0.734)  (0.787)  IPO2   -0.003  -0.037  
   (0.797)  (0.659)  IPO3   0.007  0.035  
   (0.287)  (0.520)  IPO4   0.002  -0.042  
   (0.742)  (0.312)  IPO5   0.005  0.034  
   (0.170)  (0.326)  R-squared 0.271  0.219  0.181  N 25612  1121  1112   
